July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON JUNE, 1952
Summary Minutes
3:30 - 5:00 P.M., Friday, June 27, 1952 British Foreign Office
PRESENT:
UNITED KINGDOM FRANCE
Mr. Eden M. Schuman Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd Ambassador Massigli Sir William Strang M. de Latournelle Sir Pierson Dixon M. Seydour Lord Reading M. Offroy Mr. Frank Roberts M. Laloy Mr. Scott M. Roux Mr. Denis Allen M. Labelle Lord Hood M. Mattei M. Letourneau
UNITED STATES
Secretary Acheson Ambassador Clifford Ambassador Dana Ambassador Jessup Mr. Perkins Mr. Nitze Mr. Hacker Mr. Sprouse Mr. Ringwalt Mr. Nash Mr. Battle Miss Kirkpatrick
CONTENTS Page
1. Reply to the Soviet Note 2 2. Indochina and Southeast Asia 4 3. Korea 7
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MR. EDEN opened the afternoon meeting by suggesting that the answer to the Soviet note be taken up first.
MR. SCHUMAN then made a proposal to change the text of the United States' version of the draft paragraph 7 beginning with the passage starting "As already pointed out" to read, in rough translation, as follows: "Furthermore the French Government considers that before free elections can be held the Four Governments must reach agreement on the rest of the program for the formation of an all-German Government contained in the final paragraph of the French Government's note of May 13." He thought that if we put it this way it does not mean that we expect a new conference on the one hand, or on the other that we definitely propose to go on with one conference, but simply that there can be no elections until the Four Powers agree on the status of the future German Government.
MR. ACHESON inquired whether it was necessary to have the middle part of the sentence. Would it not be possible to say that the French Government maintain their previous proposal for a meeting on the rest of the program as stated in paragraph 11 (iv) of the note of May 13? He said he was trying to bring Mr. Schuman's proposal closer to that of Mr. Eden's.
MR. SCHUMAN said that he would not insist on any particular form of words and continued that the powers of the German Government must be determined before elections can be held and that if this were not done it would give the Russians an opportunity which could make a great difference not only in Germany but also in France.
MR. ACHESON said he agreed with Mr. Schuman's conclusion but that the necessary condition is contained in the last paragraph of the note of May 13 and therefore reference to that note contains the idea. If we are to talk about the early holding of elections including the necessary conditions, the talk must necessarily take place before the elections. It could not take place at any other time.
MR. EDEN pointed out that what Mr. Schuman feared was that the (a) (iv) of paragraph 11 of the May 13 note might be executed before (b) and he was trying to insist that both must go together.
MR. SCHUMAN said that the French could not risk the danger of doing the one thing first and the next after, and that it would therefore be necessary to have agreement on the powers of an all-German Government before elections.
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It was then suggested that a working party should go out and attempt to reach an agreed text.
This was done and the working party returned with a proposed text which after brief discussion was adopted in the form indicated below, the only changes being in paragraph 1 and the opening language of paragraph 2; and in the place of the former paragraph 7 there are new paragraphs 7 and 8 as indicated below. The first sentence of the old paragraph 8 is retained as paragraph 9:
"In their note of May 13th Her Majesty's Government made various proposals in the hope of facilitating Four-Power conversations which could lead to the unification of Germany and to the negotiation with an all-German Government of a German Peace Treaty. They observe with regret that the Soviet Government in their note of May 24th do not answer these proposals. H.M.G. reaffirm all the views and proposals in their note of May 13th. In the present note however they wish to concentrate attention upon the immediate practical problem of the procedure for setting up, through free elections, an all-German Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated."
"2. In their note the Soviet Government ……"
* * * *
"7. In order to avoid further delay H.M.G., in concert with the French Government and the United States Government, and after consultation with the German Federal Republic and the German authorities in Berlin, propose that there should be an early meeting of representatives of the four Governments, provided it is understood that the four Governments are in favour of free elections throughout Germany and of the participation of a free all-German Government in the negotiation of a German peace treaty. The purpose of this meeting would be to reach agreement on the first question which must be settled if further progress is to be made, namely, the composition and functions of the commission of investigation to determine whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist. H.M.G. propose that the representatives discuss:
1. The selection of members of the commission in such a way as to ensure its impartiality.
2. The functions of the commission with a view to insuring its complete independence to make recommendations to the Four Powers.
3. The authority of the commission to carry out its investigation in full freedom and without interference.
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"8. In order that free elections can be held it will also be necessary to reach agreement on the programme for the formation of an all-German Government, as proposed in paragraph 11 (iv) of H.M.G.'s note of May 13th. H.M.G. therefore repeat that proposal for the discussion of these further important issues by representatives of the Four Powers. When such agreement is reached it will then be possible to proceed to the unification of Germany."
SCHUMAN: Military questions regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia have previously been discussed, as was done at Paris, and I should like to speak especially regarding political matters. At Washington a communiqué was issued at the end of Mr. Letourneau's talks in which it was said that the French effort in Indochina was an integral part of the free world's struggle against communist aggression. I hope that the UK will agree to this principle and that we could confirm it here in the communiqué at the end of our meetings as a sign of Western solidarity. This is the first point, which I wish to make to Mr. Eden.
The second question was dealt with at Paris, that is, the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions. These conclusions, assuming a large scale attack from Communist China, refer to air and sea support by our Allies for definite limited tasks. There is reference to the question of evacuation from Tonkin. These were the unanimous proposals of the military experts. Could they be approved diplomatically? I hope that we can have political approval of the studies of the Ad Hoc Committee in Washington in February.
The third point is the establishment of some sort of permanent military organization to concern itself with the whole of Southeast Asia, to study the military situation and to suggest measures to be taken. This organization would not be just for Indochina.
There are also other political questions. The question of a statement which would indicate Western solidarity, for which two formulae are possible: (1) A direct warning to the Chinese Communists against aggression. We have certain doubts about a direct warning of this kind. Its drawbacks are as considerable as its advantages. (b) A statement by 2, 3 or more countries - I have Australia in mind - saying that none of the countries joining in the statement would admit or tolerate aggression against the countries concerned. This would show Western solidarity and would run less risk of provocation of the Chinese Communists.
EDEN: You will recall that I made a statement at Columbia University on the subject of Chinese aggression. I must examine the question of the principle contained in the Washington communiqué and am not now prepared to
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include it in the communiqué at the end of the meetings. It is important that we draw up political assumptions for the military talks to be held.
THE SECRETARY: Mr. Schuman has made three suggestions. He wishes to put into the communiqué at the end of our meetings the principle contained in the Washington communiqué. We are willing to say again what we said in that communiqué. With reference to political support for some of the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions, I said at Paris that we would be glad to have the military people deal with the matter. We would, however, rather look at the whole thing rather than in part at this time. With reference to a permanent military organization, we would rather have such an organization grow out of the military talks in preference to setting it up before agreement on military policy.
With reference to the last suggestion of Mr. Schuman regarding formulae for a possible statement, this should grow out of the political guidance principles. A public warning may not be wise and a private warning might be wise. A public statement by 2, 3 or 4 nations might carry far reaching implications. This question should be worked out between us.
SCHUMAN: We must avoid being caught in a vicious circle. The military say that they must have political instructions and we say that the military must finish their work. We have reached the state where we must give political instructions. Mr. Eden said that he was not able to join in inserting the principle of the Washington communiqué into the communiqué to be issued at the end of our meeting. He asks whether it should include Malaya. I would answer "yes". A warning in moderate language would produce an impression on the Chinese Communists and others. A direct warning might result in adverse reactions. This question should be examined again or events may outstrip us.
THE SECRETARY: There seems to be some misunderstanding. Neither Mr. Eden nor I said that the military should not have political guidance before they continue their work. We are both ready to go to work at once to provide political guidance.
MR. LETOURNEAU: Some parts of the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee were agreed upon by all the representatives on the Committee. We should make possible the issuance of political directives which are wanted for those points on which no Ad Hoc committee agreement was reached. The US military experts said they could go so far and no farther. All the points discussed are in the Ad Hoc Committee report. We find points agreed upon and those not agreed upon. Mr. Schuman mentioned some of those points; for example, the
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warning to the Chinese Communists and the permanent military organization. These are discussed in the Committee report. The Committee must continue its work and it needs political advice and directives. The Ad Hoc Committee report also states that, while the Committee began with Indochina, it has also examined all Southeast Asian territories and discussed possible Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
MR. EDEN: We are all agreed that we must formulate political guidance. We should have certain assumptions: (1) Chinese Communist aggression: (2) we are prepared to take action in that event; (3) we must tell the Chinese we will take action in that event; and (4) the action must not be such as to risk Soviet involvement.
THE SECRETARY: We must sit down and draw up a paper as political guidance and the Ad Hoc Committee with then tell us what it s feasible to do within the confines of this guidance. With reference to Mr. Eden's statement regarding avoiding action which could result in Soviet involvement, all actions involves some kind of risk of this nature.
MR. EDEN: I agree but feel that we should reduce the risk to the minimum. With respect to the assumptions for political guidance, I suggest that we submit our assumptions to each other.
THE SECRETARY: We might produce a written paper first and then discuss it or we might discuss the question first and then produce a written draft. Messers. Nash and Nitze are here and would be glad to meet with British and French representatives in London or in Paris.
MR. EDEN: Either here or in Paris.
MR. LETOURNEAU: I would like to know if the UK and the US could approve those Ad Hoc Committee conclusions unanimously agreed upon. Mr. Eden said at Paris that they had not yet been considered by the UK but the French Government has agreed unanimously on the conclusions. Next, I would like to bring up the question of the date of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee after political guidance has been formulated. Whether the political guidance should be put into directives by the governments or in draft form is a question for decision. But the Committee meeting must be soon. In Washington the Ad Hoc Committee members spoke of the second half of July.
MR. EDEN: The UK JCS did not think that the conclusions represented agreements. I see no reason why the Committee shouldn't meet in mid-July.
MR. LETOURNEAU: I would like to ask whether the UK accepts a meeting of the experts here or in Paris to draft political directives for the Ad Hoc Committee.
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MR. EDEN: They can start tomorrow morning.
THE SECRETARY: The paper on political guidance would have to be looked at by the governments. Messrs. Nash and Nitze are here and can start tomorrow morning.
(In general discussion it was decided that the US-UK-French representatives would meet at the Foreign Office the following morning at 11 o'clock)
Turning to Korea the conversations centered around what was considered by both the French and the British representatives present as inadequate political guidance being given to the United Nations Command as well as faulty machinery for consultation. Mr. Schuman opened the discussions by stating that the French Government had followed closely events in Korea during the past few days. He said that his Government would be most interested to learn the results of the visit to Korea and Japan of Lord Alexander, and that the recent bombing of the electric power plants near the Yalu River had also raised certain serious question in the National Assembly and in the press. He certainly had no desire to intervene, and he was most grateful for the United States having taken over the main responsibility in Korea in the name and on behalf of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the French feel that it is most desirable to contain the conflict to Korea. In this connection he had noted reports that Secretary Lovett in a recent press conference had mentioned the possibility of carrying the conflict beyond the Yalu River. Obviously, military actions have important political repercussions. Therefore, he would like to bring back to Paris any indication that there was a likelihood that our policy in this connection might be changed.
With regard to Lord Alexander's visit, Mr. Eden said that Alexander had reported very favorably on conditions in Korea. He asked Mr. Lloyd who had just returned from the Far East, to discuss this question in greater detail. Mr. Lloyd said that Lord Alexander had, indeed, found the picture much better than he had anticipated. He concurred in the view of the United Nations Command that strong air action was essential in order to prevent a Communist build-up for an offensive. He said that a great deal had been done to convince the various national military units in Korea that they were all a part of the same United Nations team. He thought that General Harrison and the members of his staff were doing a wholly competent job and were looking into every conceivable approach toward the facilitation of armistice negotiations. Nevertheless, in Mr. Lloyd's opinion, there was room for improvement in the field of consultation and decision whether proposed military actions have a political significance. To illustrate his point, he mentioned that American military commanders had been taken aback over the political storm resulting
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from the mass bombing of the Yalu River plants; it would therefore seem advisable to establish machinery to give these commanders political guidance. The problem at hand, therefore, is how this could best be done.
The Secretary expressed his gratitude for the remarks of Mr. Eden and Mr. Lloyd. He pointed out however, that, granted the Yalu bombing had political repercussions, the operation was important and would have taken place with or without consultation. The Secretary mentioned that over 500 aircraft had taken part in the operation, which was carried out without loss; had there been a security violation, the result might have been far different. He said that five plants had been bombed, only one of which was near the frontier. When the United Nations forces withdrew from the Korean frontier under Chinese Communist pressures, the power plants were without equipment. Subsequently these plants had been re-equipped and had been supplying power to Communist military installations, including radar warning equipment. The bombing itself represented no change in political policy. It took place within the boundaries of Korea. It was most effective as subsequent reports showed that it had reduced the current by 90 percent. With regard to Mr. Lovett's press conference, he had plainly stated, that, if it became militarily necessary to carry air action beyond the frontier of Korea in order to protect the security of our forces, the decision would have to be taken in Washington. The Secretary said that he would make available to the French a stenographic record of Mr. Lovett's press conference. Mr. Eden wound up by stating that it seemed clear that United States policy had not changed but, so far as his Government was concerned at any rate, it was important that there be no more surprises like the Yalu River bombing.
Returning to the question of political liaison with the military authorities, Mr. Schuman mentioned that, since the Japanese Peace Treaty had become effective, there was no longer machinery for liaison with the diplomatic missions concerned. As a solution, he suggested that diplomatic representatives already accredited to the Japanese Government might also establish liaison with the United Nations Command, provided, of course, the Japanese Government did not object. The Secretary replied that there were two nations which might object to such a course; not only would the Japanese Government consider it in effect the re-establishment of SCAP but the United States would find most difficult the establishment of a center for political advisers in Tokyo in addition to Washington. He invited suggestions as to an appropriate solution of this question. Mr. Eden suggested that the diplomatic missions concerned appoint subordinate officials as liaison officers for the Korean operation. Mr. Lloyd recalled that on General Clark's staff organization there was a military liaison section and suggested that perhaps a political section could similarly be established to maintain contact with the diplomatic missions. The Secretary promised to explore the various possibilities.