July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN London, June, 1952
Summary Minutes
12:30 - 1:30 P.M., Saturday, June 28, 1952 British Foreign Office
Present:
United Kingdom United States
Mr. Eden Secretary Acheson Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd Ambassador Gifford Sir William Strang Ambassador Jessup Sir Pierson Dixon Mr. Perkins Sir Roger Makins Mr. Nitze Mr. Scott Miss Kirkpatrick Sir James Bowker Mr. Battle Mr. Allan Mr. Ringwalt Mr. Palmer
Contents Page
1. UK Observer to the Pacific Council 2 2. UN Facilities in Japan 2 3. Egypt 2 4. MEDO 4 5. Iran 5 6. Trieste 6
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United Kingdom Observer to the Pacific Council
MR. EDEN opened the conversation by assuring the Secretary that the United Kingdom was not in any sense trying to "gate crash" on the question of the Pacific Council. Nevertheless, he said, as a Pacific power the United Kingdom would hope to have a representative present in meetings of the Pacific Council. MR. EDEN mentioned that he had recently discussed this matter with Mr. Menzies, who had remarked that the presence of a British representative might create difficulties for the United States. THE SECRETARY replied that he agreed in principle to some sort of British representation but feared that the attendance of a United Kingdom observer, at least for the present, would create difficulties for all concerned, resulting as it would in other nations with interests in the area, including the Filipinos, the French, and even the Indonesians, requesting the presence of an observer. Nevertheless, THE SECRETARY said, he would be glad to discuss the question with Mr. Menzies and Mr. Holland in the forthcoming meeting in Honolulu. MR. LLOYD remarked that the Government would have to expect severe criticism as it would go down badly here that an agreement had been made to establish a Pacific Council and that the United Kingdom was without representation on the Council. MR. EDEN wound up by stating that the Government could at least say that the British position was well understood and that it would be discussed at the next meeting of the Council.
United Nations Facilities in Japan
MR. EDEN said that his Government was very grateful indeed for the effective assistance which Ambassador Murphy in Tokyo had rendered in connection with negotiations which the Commonwealth powers concerned were conducting with a view to obtaining for their armed forces in Japan a status similar to that of the United States forces.
MR. EDEN said that the Foreign Office has now prepared preliminary drafts of 2 papers. The first is a proposal for an international commission to supervise elections in the Sudan and the second is a proposed new agreement between the UK and Egypt for the administration of the Sudan. He was hopeful that these proposals might break the deadlock which presently prevails between the UK and Egypt.
At MR. EDEN's request, SIR JAMES BOWKER provided further elaboration regarding the relations between the UK and Egypt. He said that the UK feels that the recent conversations between the Sudanese and the Egyptians may provide a back door for getting conversations underway. At least, the UK feels, Egyptian eyes have now been opened to the fact that the question of the King's title is not a simple issue. If the UK recognizes the title
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without consulting the Sudanese (which it can't do), its actions would be repudiated by the Sudanese. There is, moreover, the problem created by Egypt having created a legal vacuum with respect to its position in the Sudan by its unilateral determination of the 1899 agreement. The UK thinks that Egypt would like to see some means of legitimatizing its position once more. These thoughts, together with the submission of the proposed new constitution for the Sudan to both Co-Domini by the Sudan administration, have been foremost in British thoughts in studying the whole question and have resulted in the 2 drafts mentioned by Mr. Eden which were sent yesterday to the British representatives in Khartoum and Cairo for comment.
MR. EDEN said that Ambassador Amr regards the tearing up of the l899 Agreement to have been a blunder, since it deprived Egypt of its position in the Sudan. MR. EDEN thought that the course of action outlined above might commend itself to Egypt, since the purpose of it would be to bring Egypt back into the situation with a legal standing.
MR. ACHESON asked how these new proposals tied in with what Mr. Eden and he had been talking about in the first and second Bilaterals, particularly with the question of encouraging an expansion of contacts between the Sudanese and the Egyptians.
SIR JAMES BOWKER said that the new suggestions are somewhat different. The UK is willing to let the Egyptians know of its willingness to bring the Sudanese into conversations on these questions at any time. The British understand however, that Hilali is presently awaiting SAR's reply to the matters discussed at Alexandria with the latter's representatives before deciding whether the consultation should be expanded to include other segments of Sudanese opinion.
MR. EDEN said that the Foreign Office should have Khartoum's and Cairo's comments within a week. The whole question is under urgent study and he would let the US have copies of the proposals as soon as possible.
MR. ALLEN indicated that the UK has now dropped the idea of an interim reply to the Egyptian Government's communication containing the 3 formulae on the King's title. The Egyptian Government is not pressing for an answer at the present time and the UK therefore hopes to take further time to complete work on the foregoing papers before giving any reply. He hoped that the proposals would be in shape to put forward in about a fortnight. Both Howe and Stevenson had seen the 2 drafts and had approved them, but wanted their staffs to study them.
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MR. ACHESON summed up by asking if he was correct in understanding that we were agreed that although the situation in Egypt is quiet now, it perhaps would not be by fall. Also that the question of the title is the most difficult one from the Egyptian point of view. Iraq, Pakistan and Greece have recently recognized the title and Italy, Belgium and Turkey might have to do so. The US and the UK have discussed the possibility of the UK talking to the Sudanese and encouraging them by means short of pressure to take a more forthcoming attitude. We understand that it is the UK desire that the Sudanese decision on the title should be as close as possible to what the Egyptians want. We also understand that the British are evolving proposals, of which the 2 documents mention by Mr. Eden are part, to open the back door seeing what can be done about the title and about getting Egypt back into the administration of the Sudan.
MR. EDEN said this corresponded with his understanding of what had been agreed and discussed. He added that the British hoped that if conversations with Egypt could be gotten underway, they could be expanded into 3-Power talks. It may be difficult to get the Sudanese to come in, but further bilateral Egyptian-Sudanese conversations may help pave the way. Difficulties may also be encountered in finding Sudanese who would be representative of all points of view in the Sudan, but he was hopeful that this too could be overcome.
MR. EDEN said that he had hoped to discuss MEDO with Mr. Schuman while he was here, but that he had been unable to do so.
MR. ACHESON said that he had had an opportunity to mention the matter to Mr. Schuman earlier in the morning. He had told Schuman that the US and UK had talked about this matter and that the UK was putting on paper its ideas and certain suggestions which we had made. Mr. Acheson had outlined to Mr. Schuman in general terms our thoughts regarding the organization, including the Military Representatives Committee, the Planning Group and the ad hoc coordination and liaison arrangements. Mr. Acheson had also mentioned our opposition to a formal Standing Group. Mr. Schuman had taken all this happily.
MR. EDEN expressed his pleasure that this step had been taken.
SIR PIERSON DIXON said that the UK would talk to the French next week. He added that the US and UK staffs had agreed on a paper ad referendum both Governments. When the 2 Governments had approved it, the UK would send it to the other sponsoring powers as a UK proposal.
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With regard to the Iranian situation, MR. ACHESON said that the present indications are that August will be the most likely month for Mossadaq to resign, although he has seen a telegram this morning from Ambassador Henderson indicating that Mossadaq was still maneuvering to stay in power. In view of the possibility of a change in Government, however, Mr. Acheson felt that it was desirable that the US and the UK should get their thoughts in order as soon as possible so that they would be prepared for any contingency. He thought that the most important questions before us are: (1) the nature and composition of the management agency; (2) the relationship of the agency to NIOC; (3) the duration, quantities and terms of settlement; (4) financing of the Iranian Government during the interim period before the flow of oil is resumed; and (5) whether we should encourage the Shah to believe that the UK is really ready to act quickly if he takes action.
SIR ROGER MAKINS agreed that these were the most important points in the situation. He had talked over most of these matters with Mr. Nitze and told him as much as he could at the present time of UK thinking.
MR. EDEN said that the main problem seems to be that a situation may arise in Iran in which Mossadaq is wobbling and needs a push. He understood that the US concern is that if it were to join the UK in giving him this push it would first want to be assured that the UK is ready with proposals. He felt that the US should be given all possible information regarding the UK plans. On the financial question AIOC has cash available. He had thought that one time that it would be logical for the company to make an advance to a new Iranian Government to help it out of the difficult financial situation in which it would find itself. During Mr. Middleton's recent stay in London, he had maintained, however, that no new Iranian Government could accept such an arrangement without incurring a sever risk of falling. This made this situation more difficult.
SIR ROGER MAKINS said that he understood from his conversation with Mr. Nitze that the US is trying to get itself into position whereby it would be ready to advance funds to help out a new Iranian Government. While there was probably nothing that the UK Government could do toward extending direct assistance, there might be other ways in which it could help, particularly by relaxing some of the present economic and financial restrictions on Iran.
MR. EDEN asked Sir Roger if he did not feel that the company could extend financial assistance. SIR ROGER was doubtful and pointed out that quite aside from the question of the Iranian Government's financial needs, the oil industry itself would need a considerable amount of money to get it back on its feet again.
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MR. NITZE stressed that the important thing is for the US and the UK to get together and coordinate their positions. The US appreciates that the British need to retain flexibility in their tactics. It is also important that no hint regarding any conversations between us should become known to the Iranians. Given these points, however, he felt that we need a better understanding than we have at the present time of what the British views are on the "substance" and "tactics" of an oil settlement.
SIR ROGER MAKINS felt that the British had already brought us as much up to date as they could at this time regarding their thinking on "substance". He added that "tactics" could not be definitely decided until the nature of the Government with which it would be necessary to deal were known.
MR. EDEN felt that it is important to keep the US fully informed. Although maneuverability is essential from the British point of view, we must keep in close touch on the oil settlement and financing problems. This is particularly important in view of the possibility of a change taking place by August. He suggested that further conversations, similar to those which have been going on in the past should be held in Washington to assure that the US is kept up to date. MR. ACHESON agreed with this procedure.
Before leaving the subject of Iran, MR. EDEN reverted to the question of financing. He said the Foreign Office was in constant touch with AIOC on the question of financial aid for Iran. He would like to see the aid handled in this manner, but he was inclined to think that a new Iranian Government would probably not accept it from AIOC. As regards Mossadaq, Mr. Eden thought that he would probably not retire gracefully from office, but would need a final push by the US and UK.
At MR. EDEN'S request, SIR PIERSON DIXON related the latest developments of the Trieste problem. Since the first Bilateral conversation on this subject had taken place on June 24, the Yugoslav Ambassador had called at the Foreign Office and said that the Yugoslavs were ready to resume conversations with the Italians but that they felt the atmosphere was not favorable at the present time. The Ambassador had presented this as a firm position. The Foreign Office had tried to ascertain what the Yugoslavs had in the back of their minds, but the Ambassador only indicated that his Government thought that the Yugoslav position with respect to Zone "A" had been prejudiced by the London Conference. The Yugoslavs were also upset by the interpretation which the Italian press had given to the results of the conference. In view of the Ambassador's demarche, the UK doubts that the present time is propitious to approach the Yugoslav Government along the lines discussed on the 24th.
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MR. ACHESON asked if the Yugoslav Ambassador had indicated that his Government wanted all of Zone "B" and most of Zone "A"?
SIR PIERSON DIXON said that this had been about the gist of it. The Ambassador had indicated that Yugoslavia would be willing to enter discussions only on the basis of minor rectifications of Zone "B".
MR. EDEN thought the Yugoslavs may figure that DeGaspari is in a difficult position with respect to Italian public opinion on the Trieste problem and that their best tactic is to hold out. He felt that if this were the case, the Yugoslavs were making a bad miscalculation, because if deGaspari were forced to resign on this issue, his successor might be even more difficult to deal with.
MR. ACHESON said the main question seems to be how to handle Tito in this matter. He suggested that the US and British Ambassadors should sit down with Tito personally and talk the matter out, stressing that this is a most serious sore and the Yugoslavs must be cooperative. If we could soften Tito up in this way, we could them come in with our proposals for renewed conversations.
SIR PIERSON DIXON said that the main trouble is that we do not have much effective pressure which we can bring to bear on Tito. Because of wider considerations, we cannot threaten to turn off the tap.
MR. EDEN said that he agreed with Mr. Acheson that we must get at Tito. Mr. Eden might go to Belgrade in September, but the matter could not wait that long. Tito's present absence from Belgrade presents problems, but the Ambassadors might go to the Dalmatian Coast to see him. The Foreign Office would be glad to draft a paper suggesting the lines that 2 Ambassadors might take with Tito and send it to Washington for the Department's consideration.
The Secretary agreed with this procedure. Mr. Perkins observed that he did not feel there was any great hurry in pressing forward and that a further delay of a week or 10 days would probably do no harm.