DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: July 17, 1952
SUBJECT: Trieste
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Mr. Vladimir Popovic, Yugoslav Ambassador Mr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy Mr. John C. Campbell, EE
COPIES TO: S/S (2) American Embassy, London EUR - Messrs Perkins and Bonbright American Embassy, Rome EE - Mr. Barbour American Embassy, Belgrade WE - Mr. Byington US POLAD, Trieste
Following inquiries on Germany and other matters connected with my recent trip to Europe and Brazil, Ambassador Popovic mentioned reports that the question of Trieste had been touched upon in conversations held during my stay in London and asked whether I would say anything about those talks.
I said that Mr. Eden and I had given some attention to the question of Trieste although we had not dealt at length with it. I said that we both felt, as we had previously, that every effort should be made to get this troublesome problem settled. We were considering the desirability of again urging both Italy and Yugoslavia to undertake direct negotiations toward settlement. Then, while the matter was still under consideration, the Yugoslav Ambassador in London called on the Foreign Office and said that his government did not consider the atmosphere propitious for any attempt at a settlement. In the face of this negative attitude Mr. Eden and I had not pursued the matter further. I then told Ambassador Popovic that I was very much disturbed over the lack of progress on this question. I said I did not believe the prospects would get any better with the passage of time but would in fact get worse, particularly since an Italian election would be coming up next year. I said I believed that now was the time to attempt to reach an agreement. I added that in my opinion this was one question which, if not solved, was certain to cause further trouble for all of us and interfere with the cooperation which was so necessary among the nations concerned with the security of this part of Europe.
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The Ambassador said that his government was in a very difficult position on the Trieste question. So long as the Declaration of March 20, 1948 was not repudiated and so long as arrangements were made to give the Italians more and more control of Zone A, Yugoslavia necessarily felt that its rights were being ignored and that the Italians were being encouraged to pursue extreme policies and make demands which Yugoslavia could never accept. He said that the Italians had not shown any willingness to reach a fair settlement and that the United States and Great Britain had not been impartial; on the contrary, their attitude, exemplified by the recent London arrangements regarding Zone A, encouraged Italian Irredentism.
I said that I thought the Ambassador was mistaken in his interpretation of Italy's attitude. I told him it was my belief that the Italian Government sincerely wished to reach a settlement before the beginning of the election campaign, and that the Italians would be reasonable and would not take a position which would make a settlement impossible.
Ambassador Popovic replied that recent developments in Zone A and Italian Irredentist agitation confirmed his view of the Italian attitude. In the present circumstances Yugoslavia could not take the initiative to reopen negotiations. However, if the Italians should offer to resume negotiations, bearing in mind the proposals for settlement which Yugoslavia has made, the Yugoslav Government would be glad to enter discussions with them.
I said that I was very much interested in his last remark in view of the impression we had received from the statements of the Yugoslav Ambassador to London that the Yugoslav Government was not willing to proceed with any negotiations at this time. I asked Ambassador Popovic whether his remark indicated a change in the Yugoslav position. He said that he did not believe that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London had indicated that Yugoslavia would not discuss Trieste if the Italians offered to do so, bearing in mind the Yugoslav proposals. I referred to the account which we had of Ambassador Brilej's statement, as relayed to us by the British, which clearly had the negative character which I had mentioned. He said that, speaking quite frankly, what the Yugoslav Government was trying to do at that time was to discourage any US-UK proposal to Yugoslavia on Trieste. I remarked jocularly that apparently they feared that the US and UK might gang up with the Italians against Yugoslavia. He said that this was the case. He then repeated that, should there be a reasonable Italian approach to resume discussions, he was convinced that his government was prepared to cooperate in seeking a solution. I said that I was glad to hear that and reiterated my opinion that a compromise, taking into account the legitimate rights and interests of both Italy and Yugoslavia, was urgent for all concerned.
EUR:EE:JCCampbell: la