July 24, 1952
ANZUS COUNCIL PREPARATIONS. HONOLULU, AUGUST 1952
Background Paper
References in the Negotiation of the ANZUS Treaty To Broader Security Arrangements Affecting the Pacific Area
The attached paper has been prepared by the Division of Historical Research (RE) as background information for the use of Secretary Acheson and the other members of the U.S. Delegation to the forthcoming ANZUS Council Meeting in Honolulu, August 4-6, 1952.
This paper is not being distributed outside the State Department, and, therefore, is not included in the regular HCF document series.
Christopher Van Hollen Secretary
REFERENCES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE ANZUS TREATY TO BROADER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING THE PACIFIC AREA
I. Summary
Throughout the period of the negotiation of the tripartite security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951 (the ANZUS Treaty) there were constant references to broader security arrangements affecting the Pacific area. United States policy since late 1949 (as expressed in NSC 48/2) had been that the United States Government had great sympathy with non-Communist, indigenous efforts in Asia to form regional associations based on self-help and mutual aid and that if such associations were brought into being it was willing to consider ways in which it might assist them. By the beginning of 1951, however, the United States had decided that it was desirable to take a more active role in building a security system in the Pacific area. With this in mind, John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, was sent to the Far East early in 1951 on a special mission, with the rank of Ambassador, with instructions to discuss a security arrangement to which the parties would be the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps Indonesia - in other words all the nations exercising sovereignty over the so-called "island chain" stretching from the Aleutians to New Zealand, excluding Formosa (although in Manila Dulles mentioned the possibility of including Formosa in the security arrangement under discussion).
When Dulles reached Canberra, however, the negotiations changed direction. Partly because of British opposition to the "island chain" basis for a security pact, from which the United Kingdom would have been excluded, and partly because of the strong Australian and New Zealand preference for a "white" Pacific pact, Dulles' Canberra negotiations were conducted with the possibility of a tripartite pact in view, although with the understanding that it might be possible to reach agreement on substance without finalizing the list of participating powers and with the clear statement on Dulles's part that the United States might wish to include at least the Philippines.
The draft treaty resulting from Dulles' conferences in Canberra made specific reference to a future "development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area" and provided for the "closest possible relations" between the Council to be established under its terms "with other States in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific Area". The draft provided also that this Council, which would have "subsidiary bodies", would "coordinate its planning…with that of other regional organizations and associations of States of which one or more Parties are members". It was understood by the Conferees in Canberra that there would be a military
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section of the Council, and it was the desire of Australia at least that the Council should be the mechanism through which that country could keep in touch with NATO planning.
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff took strong exception to some of the terms of the Canberra draft, and Dulles, in an effort to meet their objections negotiated revisions in the draft so that the final ANZUS Treaty omitted all reference to subsidiary bodies of the Council and to coordinated planning and referred merely to a "consultative relationship" with States or groups of States "in the Pacific area". At the conclusion of the negotiation of these revisions Dulles noted that what was left was a purely political organ, but this view of the effect of the revisions now appears not to have been shared by Australia and New Zealand. In the course of negotiations Australia indicated that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement "on matters that do not affect the basic substance of the treaty", and it is possible that in the Australian view a military function for the Council was a part of the Treaty's "basic substance" not to be affected by verbal changes.
The ANZUS Treaty was finally signed as one in a series of security agreements which were related in a broad sense although not tied together by their terms. The other instruments in this series were the Philippine- American security treaty, the Japanese-American Security treaty, and the Japanese peace treaty. It was clearly understood that Australian and New Zealand concurrence in a Japanese peace treaty which would permit the rearmament of Japan was conditioned on the conclusion of the ANZUS security pact, and that the American desire for wider security arrangements in the Pacific found expression in the bilateral treaties with Japan and the Philippines which were concluded at the same time. The ANZUS Treaty retained from the Canberra draft the specific reference to a future "development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area", and it was referred to by the Australian Ambassador at the time of signature as the "first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening system of peaceful security in the vital area" of the Pacific.
II. United States Policy toward a Pacific Pact before the Dulles Mission
The decision of the United States government in January 1951 to explore the possibilities of concluding a six-power mutual security arrangement in the Pacific area had received its initial impetus four months before in conversations held in this country by officials of the Department of State with Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender. These conversations in turn were based on Spender's public advocacy in March 1950 of a defensive military arrangement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and other Commonwealth countries, and including eventually the United States. 1 1 From Canberra, tels. 46 and 71, Feb. 22 and March 10, 1950
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Because this proposal had envisioned a "white" nucleus for a Pacific Pact, and because it had been put forward at a time when the Government of the Philippines was sponsoring the Baguio Conference looking toward a broader Asian Association, it had not evoked a positive reaction from the United States Government. Through the American Ambassador to Australia the Department of State had merely taken the position, consistent with the policy set forth in NSC 48/2 (approved December 30,1949), that it had great sympathy with non-Communist, indigenous efforts in Asia to form regional associations based on self-help and mutual aid and that if such associations eventuated it was willing to consider ways in which it might assist them.1
By the late summer of 1950, the Baguio Conference having proved abortive and the invasion of Korea having further alarmed the free world to the dangers of Communist aggression, the Australian Minister for External Affairs had several new strings to his bow. The promptness with which the United States and the United Nations had gone to the aid of the Republic of Korea was an effective answer to whatever fears Australia might have had as to its security, but Spender now argued that Australia should have some part in the basic policy decisions which would affect its welfare and that a Pacific Pact would meet this need for "organic political machinery that would enable Australia to participate in global planning."2 He argued further that such a security arrangement would not only serve a real strategic purpose in the event of war in the Pacific but would also help Australia to discharge its military responsibilities in the Middle East. He pointed out most emphatically that unless the Australian people had some reassurance of American protection it would be difficult for his Government to go along with the American proposal for a Japanese peace treaty which placed no controls upon Japan's rearmament.3
Influenced in particular by this last consideration the Department of State sought more specific information as to Spender's views on a possible Pacific Pact. 4 The department's position here followed the lines of NSC 48/2,
1ToCanberra, tel. 34, Feb. 25, 1950, secret: Connnors (FE) to Butterworth (FE), memorandum, Mar. 22, 1950, confidential
2Memorandum of conversation held in Washington, Sept. 13, 1950, by Secretary Acheson and Assistant Secretary Perkins with Spender and Australian Ambassador to the United States Makin, secret: memorandum of conversation held in Washington, Sept. 15, 1950, by Ambassador Jessup and Wayne G. Jackson with Spender and Makin, secret.
3Memorandum of conversation held at New York, Oct. 12, 1950, by Assistant Secretary Hickerson and Ward P. Allen with Spender and Australian Ambassador to France Sir Keith Officer, secret.
4John Ross (USUN) to Rusk (FE), letter, Oct. 7, 1950, confidential; to New York, Tel. 387, Oct. 12, 1950, secret.
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namely, that the United States Government was willing to discuss the means of developing security arrangements in Asia and the Pacific but that there were tremendous difficulties that had to be overcome.1 While admitting that there were these difficulties, Spender maintained that they should only condition the end result and should not prevent the achievement of the essential purpose. He proposed a pact among Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States, and possibly Canada, that would (1) contain an obligation substantially similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and (2) provide for some sort of continuing council with some adjunctive military mechanism, but nothing as "elaborate and cumbersome" as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.2 Spender did not regard as valid the objections to a "white pact" of this sort or to the exclusion of the Asian mainland, for he maintained that Asia would respect strength and that the mainland would be difficult to defend in any case. He maintained also that such a pact would better satisfy Australia's desires than would arrangements of a more informal nature, but he did admit that some kind of bilateral agreement with the United States would help to fulfill Australia's immediate requirements.3
To all this the United States Government made no immediate reply, but within the Department of State consideration was given to various ways to meet the desires of the Australians. It was brought to the attention of the Department that the New Zealand Government also would regard it as extremely difficult to accept a rearmed Japan without a firm security guarantee from the United States.4 On October 11, 1950 a memorandum was submitted to Assistant Secretary Rusk which analyzed the various forms which a regional association in Asia might take - an Asian Association, a Pacific Pact, a Trilateral Treaty with new Zealand and Australia, or a
1to New York, tel. 387, Oct. 12, 1950, secret.
2Indonesia, Spender asserted, should be asked but would probably refuse, while Japan should be a party at some future time. For various reasons he also ruled out China, France, the Netherlands, and Thailand, but (if politically advisable) he had no objections to participation by Chile and other Latin American States.
3Memorandum of conversation held in New York, Oct. 12, 1950, by Hickerson and Allen with Spender and Officer, secret.
4Memorandum of conversation held at New York, Oct. 19, 1950, by Dulles, New Zealand Minister for External Affairs Doidge, and others, secret.
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Trilateral Declaration with the same countries - and which concluded that the last possibility being a simple statement and an agreement to consult on matters of common political and military concern, would be the most feasible because, though it might not meet Australian desires, it would be the least complicated and might win the support of Australia and new Zealand to the proposed Japanese peace treaty.1 Other alternatives such as a secret consultative staff committee composed of representatives of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and possibly the United Kingdom, or a Presidential declaration relating to the offshore Asian islands, were also given consideration, and in a letter to the Secretary of Defense on November 17 Secretary Acheson suggested that the Australians be invited to send a high-level military mission to Washington to participate in planning which might later involve the disposition of Australian forces and material.2
Little active consideration was given to a possible Pacific Pact, however, until after the intervention of Communist Chinese forces in the Korean conflict had caused the United States government to reappraise the Far Eastern policy. In a letter to the Secretary of Defense on December 13, 1950, the Secretary of State proposed among other things that this Government explore the possibilities of a mutual-assistance arrangement among the Pacific Island nations (defined as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia) which would have the dual purpose of assuring combined action to resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should again become aggressive. The Secretary of State further suggested that this arrangement be reached in two stages: (l) a meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries concerned (excluding Japan) at which would be issued a declaration of intent to make peace with Japan and to consult regarding mutual security interests, and (2) a more formal arrangement, to be announced simultaneously with the conclusion of peace with Japan, and to which also Japan would be a party.3
By early January, although consideration of this two-stage procedure was still active, the discussions going forward between the Departments of State and Defense were concentrated on a possible Pacific Pact. At a meeting on January 3, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that the Department of State at the earliest opportunity explore the possibilities of such a pact, their reservations being that it should be strictly confined to the island nations of the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, ____________________________________________________________________________ _ 1Emmerson (FE) to Rusk, memorandum, Oct. 11, 1950, secret.
2Merchant (FE) to Emmerson, memorandum, Oct. 19, 1950, secret: Emmerson to Rusk, memorandum, Oct. 26, 1950, secret; Acheson to Marshall, letter, Nov. 17, 1950 secret.
3See memorandum of conversation, Dec. 1, 1950, between Acheson and Battle (S), secret; paper entitled "Pacific Declaration", dated Dec. 7, 1950, drafted by Emmerson, top secret. A revised draft of the latter, dated Dec. 12, mentioned "possibly Canada and Indonesia" as parties together with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
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the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and possibly Indonesia) and that under no circumstances should the United States take a position in which it would be committed to furnish military strength for the defense of Hong Kong. The United Kingdom was accordingly omitted from the draft pact which the Department prepared.1
This draft pact, simpler and less specific as to action required than the North Atlantic Treaty, consisted of four articles. By it each of the Parties would confirm its intention to preserve domestic liberty and order. Each Party would also recognize that if there should be direct aggression in the form of armed attack in the Pacific Ocean upon any of the Parties such attach would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and each Party would declare that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Parties would further establish a Pacific Ocean Council, to meet periodically, with a view to recommending appropriate measures to implement the inherent right of collective self defense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as well as to be available to cooperate with the United Nations through such bodies as the Collective Measures Committee. This Council would continue in being until a majority of the Parties considered it unnecessary, with the provision that any Party could withdraw upon one year's notice and that upon receipt of such notice [e.g., from Japan] the other Parties would immediately confer together to consider the situation thereby created.2
In the instructions to Ambassador Dulles cleared with the Joint Chiefs on January 8 and approved by the President two days later explicit provision was made for the discussion by Dulles with other powers of the possible Pacific Pact here outlined. Indeed, on this mission Dulles was to have in mind that
"… the United States Government is willing to make a mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and perhaps Indonesia) which would have the dual purpose of assuring combined action as between the members to resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should again become aggressive."
1Allison (S) to Jessup and others, memorandum, Jan. 4, 1951, secret.
2Draft of Jan. 9, 1951 secret. For Ambassador Dulles's comments on the January 4 draft, which was only altered in some details in the later draft, see memorandum to Ambassador Jessup, et al. from Dulles, Jan. 4, 1951, secret
-7- The instructions specified, however, that the United States would agree to this course of action only as the other nations accepted the general basis on which the United States was prepared to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. Furthermore, Dulles was advised that his discussions would "in no way involve final commitments by the United States Government", and he was to avoid giving any contrary impression.1 Enclosure to memorandum for the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense, Jan. 9, 1951, top secret.
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III. The Dulles Mission to Tokyo and Manila
The intentions of the United States Government were first revealed to the United Kingdom on January 12, 1951,1 when Sir Oliver Franks called to discuss with Dulles the latter's forthcoming visit to Japan. Having explained why the United States Government thought that Japan should be allowed to rearm so long as there was some assurance that Japan would not again become aggressive, Dulles went on to say that the United States was considering in a most tentative way the possibility of some security arrangement among those nations with major Pacific island territories. After he had reviewed the possible participants and their obligations he was asked whether the United Kingdom would be included. To this question Dulles replied that British membership had not been contemplated, since it had been thought best to limit the area to the major island nations of the Pacific, but that "it would probably be possible and perhaps desirable to arrange for some form of consultative cooperation between the United Kingdom and the other signatory members to the arrangement." Any fuller participation that this, Dulles concluded, might raise the question of French, Dutch, or Portuguese participation, which might not be desirable.2
Counselor of the British Embassy, Hubert Graves, appeared somewhat startled at this explanation, but the full reaction of the British did not become apparent until Dulles had arrived in Tokyo. In a conversation on February 2 with the British Ambassador there, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, Dulles learned of the strong opposition of the British Foreign Office to a Pacific Pact from which the United Kingdom was excluded. He learned also that the British military authorities considered the proposals for a Council, to which they referred as the "Defense Council", to be unacceptable, though in the longer term, should conditions in the non-Communist Asian countries become more stabilized, a more representative consultative Defense Council might be a useful first step, they though, toward a regional defense pact.3
Dulles observed to Gascoigne that the only reason the United States had excluded the United Kingdom from the proposed arrangement was that the latter had no territories within the island chain which the draft pact covered. Dulles then added that the United States recognized the United Kingdom's Commonwealth concern and that if the United Kingdom contributed sea and air power to the defense of the island chain it might be an appropriate charter member of any consultative group set up to deal with the defense needs of 1. The following passage supplements HON D-3/3 2. Memorandum of conversation held at Washington, Jan. 12, 1951 3. From Tokyo, tel. 1492, Feb. 2, 1951, secret.
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the Western Pacific area as a whole. The British Ambassador was cautioned, however, that these remarks were "entirely personal, representing thinking which he [Dulles] had done on the plane, and should not be interpreted as representing the view of his Government."3
Following his report of this conversation to the Department of State, Ambassador Dulles the same day requested an opinion as to whether he should try to lead Australia to suggest a new approach which would include the United Kingdom but would limit the area to the Aleutians, Japan, the Ryukyus, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, and possibly Indonesia. He then outlined a revised declaration that would embody this idea in three articles by which each declarant would (1) recognize that the parts of this island chain had security problems that were related and distinctive, (2) recognize that an armed attack upon any of the areas mentioned would be dangerous to its own peace and security because of its direct responsibility therein or in the case of the United Kingdom because of its Commonwealth ties with Australia and new Zealand, and (3) consult together periodically with a view to concerting appropriate measures to implement their inherent right of collective self-defense of the areas in question.2
On February 6 the British Ambassador at Tokyo reiterated his Government's objections to the Defense Council and to the Pacific Pact itself. He requested clarification, however, of Dulles' idea as to how the United Kingdom would participate in consultations if it had no territories in the island chain, to which Dulles replied his personal, tentative suggestion had been that though the United Kingdom had no territories in the areas to be defended in common it would in all other respects be a participant in the declaration and in any consultations about how to defend the chain. Dulles also stated that the only reason the United States favored consideration of such a pact was because of the dilemma over the Japanese peace treaty, and that if the British Government could persuade Australia and New Zealand to go along with the American views on the treaty, then the United States would drop the idea of a security pact at once.3
The strong opposition of the United Kingdom , which was confirmed by a decision of the British Cabinet on February 12,4 caused the United States Government to take an even more tentative and general attitude toward a possible Pacific Pact. The Department of State informed Dulles on February 10
1. "Notes of Conversation Between Ambassador Dulles and the British Ambassador", Tokyo, Feb. 2, 1951, prepared by Fearey (NA), secret 2. From Tokyo, Tel. 1500, Feb.2, 1951, secret 3. "Notes of Conversation Between Ambassador Dulles and the British Ambassador", Tokyo, Feb.6, 1951, prepared by Fearey, secret 4. For the position of the British Cabinet see Annex to Hon D-3/3.
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that it saw no objection to the lien which he had taken on a revised declaration that would include the United Kingdom, but it thought that this suggestion should be discussed as one alternative rather than as a preferred position. As other alternatives the Department of State suggested a unilateral declaration by the United States, a series of bilateral arrangements, a tripartite pact, or perhaps a loose association, including the mainland states, but without any defense commitment by the United States.1
The conversations in which Ambassador Dulles engaged in Manila on his way from Tokyo to Canberra further complicated and certainly did not advance the negotiation of a Pacific Pact. In discussing with President Quirino the importance of maintaining the integrity of the "island chain", Dulles included Formosa as one of the island regions for which some form of security arrangement should be developed. When Quirino, having emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa, sought the views of the United States Government on a Pacific security arrangement, however, Dulles said that his Government had no specific proposal to advance but was prepared to listen sympathetically to all proposals which the countries most directly concerned might wish to make. Dulles explained that in his Government's views the problems of security of the island chain could be most easily solved and should be considered separately from any security arrangement involving the mainland.2
IV. The Canberra Discussions
During the initial discussions in Canberra with the Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs (P.C. Spender and F.W. Doidge, respectively) Dulles explained that he had left Washington with broad authority to make a security pact that would include Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, the United States, and possibly Indonesia, but that in Tokyo he had been thrown off balance by the strong opposition of the United Kingdom to such a pact. Stressing that as a consequence of the Tokyo talks the entire matter would have to be reconsidered, Dulles added that his Mission could not deal with the matter of a security arrangement with finality but that the principal possibilities appeared to be ": (1) a series of bilateral arrangements between the United States and various Pacific island countries; (2) a trilateral arrangement among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, either coupled with or independent of a bilateral understandings with the United Kingdom and the Philippines; (3) a joint arrangement among Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United States, plus a Japanese-American 1 .To Tokyo, tel. 1232, Feb. 8, 1951, secret. 2 Memorandum by Allison of conversation among Quirino, Dulles, Ambassador Cowen, and others, Feb. 12, 1951, confidential
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bilateral arrangement; and (4) a joint arrangement participated in by the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. Dulles noted that the United States did not contemplate anything as elaborate as the North Atlantic Treaty, but rather something simpler, leaving for future developments the possibility of bringing in Japan and "certain other countries, possibly including certain mainland countries." After Spender had expressed surprise that the United States should have been so deterred by British objections since Australia was the principal nation in the Pacific area, Dulles observed that he had not indicated to the United Kingdom that the United States accepted the British objections as valid. Nevertheless, the United States did attach importance to them and saw difficulty in proceeding in the face of strong British opposition.1
At the session next day (February 17) Dulles stated that as much as the United States cherished its relationship with Australia and New Zealand it could not believe that a pact with them alone was an adequate arrangement for the security of the vast Pacific area. He observed also that the United States would be glad to have a pact in which the United Kingdom would be a member but that it did not wish to have the United Kingdom, France, and other colonial powers participate until they could be balanced by participation of a number of Asian peoples. He stated further: "We do not want the tripartite pact, if concluded, to appear to be the final word for the security of the Pacific area. There are too many countries left out." Although Doidge said that both his country and Australia would have a hard time selling any arrangement which seemed to involve Japan, Spender observed that it was essential that Japan ultimately be brought in "on our side of the fence and that we should begin to look to that day."2
The conferees then discussed the text of a draft treaty among the United States, Australia, and New Zealand which their staffs had prepared in the light of the preceding day's discussions with the understanding that its substance could be discussed before a decision had been reached as to whether other States would be asked to sign it. A clear reference to the possible enlargement of the treaty was contained in the preamble of this draft:
"The Parties to this Treaty, ……………………………….. "Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security pending the _____________________________________
1. "Notes on Conversation Among Ambassador Dulles, Australian, and New Zealand Ministers for External affairs and Staffs," prepared by Fearey, Canberra, Feb. 16, 1951, secret. 2. The quotations are from Fearey's notes and may not represent the actual words of the speakers.
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development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area…"
Reference to a tripartite council to be set up under the treaty was found in Articles VII and VIII. The draft of Article VII read:
"The Parties hereby establish a Council on which each of them shall be represented to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time, and may set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to accomplish its purposes."
The draft of Article VIII specified:
"The Parties recognize that this Treaty may be more effectively implemented in association with other States and groups of States not parties to this Treaty. The Council, established by Article VII, shall therefore maintain the closest possible relations with and consult with other States in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific Area. The Council shall also coordinate its planning so far as possible with that of other regional organizations and associations of States of which one or more of the Parties are members."
Apparently no questions were raised concerning Article VIII, but with respect to Article VII Spender raised the question as to the site of the Council, suggesting Washington as the best site from the Standpoint of Australia. In reply, Dulles noted that it could at least be agreed that the treaty should not specify where the site should be.
Dulles noted also that there were strong objections to the inclusion of Japan in such a pact at that time and said that he had accepted this position for many reasons, among them the attitude of the United Kingdom. Dulles indicated that they status of the Philippines had also been left undetermined and that the United States would not want to make any final decision regarding the Philippines until after his Mission had returned to Washington. He added that "it might then conclude that the exclusion of the Philippines would have such serious consequences that it would want to ask Australia and New Zealand to agree to the Philippines becoming a party." Spender observed in reply that although Australia preferred a tripartite pact, "it would not resist the idea of including the Philippines if the U.S. Government thought that wise."
At the third concluding meeting in Canberra, Spender pointed out that Australia still feared Japan but that he had been much impressed by
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Dulles' sympathetic consideration of what Australia considered to be the first step, namely, a Pacific Pact. He indicated that his approach to the problem of a Japanese Treaty had been conditioned by Dulles' attitude toward the pact. 1
Prior to his departure from Canberra Dulles sent identical letters to Doidge and Spender dated February 18, 1951. In these he stated with reference to the draft ANZUS treaty which had been discussed: "I must emphasize that I have no authority to commit my Government to its acceptance and that a final decision on the part of my Government must wait upon the report which I shall make upon my return and upon consideration by my Government of the bearing of the proposed treaty, both in substance and in detailed wording" upon all elements of the world situation. He noted further that the instructions of his Mission had contemplated a Pacific security arrangement more comprehensive than a tripartite treaty and that the ANZUS treaty draft discussed the day before had been prepared to enable the conferees to "explore together matters of substance and without prejudice to the question of who might be the parties', the United States desiring "clearly to reserve the position of the Philippine Republic in this respect." Dulles observed finally that he recognized the interdependence between the contemplated Japanese peace treaty and the projected security treaty "in the sense that neither of us would be obligated to accept one without the other."2
Neither in these letters nor in the notes of the Canberra meetings kept up by the Dulles Mission does there appear anything concerning the military aspects of the draft tripartite pact. Nevertheless, in a letter to General Douglas MacArthur describing the negotiations conducted by his Mission, Dulles indicated with respect to Article VII of the draft treaty: "Both Australia and New Zealand expressed a desire that the council and its subsidiary bodies be kept as small and simple as possible. They are particularly concerned that no large organization comparable to NATO be set up. The United States and New Zealand seemed to agree that the military portion of the council should be in Melbourne where the British Commonwealth Joint Chiefs of Staff are located, but Australia wanted it located in Washington, presumably because they want to establish contact with the overall military planning agencies located in the United States." In explaining Article VIII Dulles wrote: "This article permits liaison and consultation with other states. Australia and New Zealand desired this in order to help overcome the objections of the United Kingdom to a Pacific Pact of which she was not 1. "Notes on Conversation Among Ambassador Dulles, Australian and New Zealand Ministers for External Affairs and Staffs", Canberra, morning and afternoon of Feb. 17, 1951, prepared by Fearey, secret. 2. Dulles to Doidge and Spender, letters, Feb. 18, 1951, confidential.
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a member. The last sentence is designed primarily to permit coordination in planning between the Pacific Pact and a U.S.-Japan Bilateral Pact until Japan can become a member of the former. This would also permit coordination between the council of the Pacific Pact and the United States in regard to Philippine defense in the event that the Philippines were not a charter member. Also, Australia wants some liaison with NATO." With respect to possible Philippine participation in the pact, Dulles told MacArthur that both Doidge and Spender had "indicated that, in their personal opinions, there would be no serious objections to such action."1
1. Dulles to Macarthur, letter, Mar. 2, 1951, top secret.
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V. Discussion and Revision of the Canberra Draft
The Australian position with respect to the Philippines was modified in a letter from Spender to Dulles dated March 21, 1951, in which Spender wrote:
"You will be fully aware of the Australian attitude from the talks in Canberra. I know that you will not misunderstand me when I repeat that our preference is for a tri-partite arrangement of the kind drafted in Canberra, the special position of the Philippines being met if necessary by a separate arrangement between the United States and the Philippines. Australian public opinion, which would with great enthusiasm welcome such a three-power arrangement, would display some hesitation were the pact extended to include the Philippines".1
That a similar view with respect to the Philippines was held by the United Kingdom was conveyed to Dulles by the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Franks. On March 30 Franks told Dulles informally that his impression was that, while the United Kingdom would be pleased over the possibility of a trilateral ANZUS pact, the expansion of this agreement to include the Philippines was looked upon with a great deal of misgiving. On April 5 Franks conveyed his Government's formal view that:
"The United Kingdom is most anxious that any discussions on the Philippine issue in relation to a Pacific pact should not in any way jeopardize the successful conclusion of a Pacific Pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States."
He added that the United Kingdom hoped that the Philippine issue could be dealt with in some way other than by including the Philippines outright in a pact with Australia and New Zealand. He suggested, for example, that the United States might enter into a bilateral pact with the Philippines identical and simultaneous with the tripartite agreement, but intimated that the United Kingdom would reconsider its position if the United States stood firm in its desire to include the Philippines in a Four-Power Pact. As one of the arguments advanced for the British position Franks pointed out that the United Kingdom had hoped that ultimately it would be possible to bring many of the countries in the area together in some common defense arrangement, and he said that it would be "invidious" to set up then what would appear to be a general
1Spender to Dulles, message, Mar. 21, 1951, top secret.
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defense arrangement and have only one of the Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines, represented. Dulles promised that the United States would give serious consideration to the British views.1
These views were set forth by Dulles in a draft memorandum for the President which outlined the trend of negotiations for a Pacific security pact and detailed the objections of the United Kingdom to a single pact which seemed to embrace only the island chain and thereby increased the Asian mainland's danger. This draft memorandum cited the fact that the United Kingdom did not object to a series of arrangements between the United States and Japan, the United States and the Philippines, and the United States, Australia, and New Zealand "which would provide for consultation and coordinated planning with as common denominator the influence and participation of the United States",2 and it expressed the views that three such arrangements would achieve the objectives set forth in the President's directive to Dulles of January 10, 1951. Dulles also prepared a draft press statement to be made by the President regarding the Dulles Mission, outlining plans for concluding the three pacts discussed above and stating that these steps were "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area."3
When these two draft documents were submitted for comment to the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the Secretary of Defense that both papers be revised. They stated that there were serious disadvantages in the formulation of new mutual security arrangements between the United States and the Philippine Republic since any enlargement of the scope of Philippine participation in United States security arrangements over that already in effect would be contrary to United States security interests. They said furthermore:
"Any trilateral arrangement with Australia and New Zealand should be made as a simple understanding or public declaration rather than by formal pact. If political considerations are so overriding that a formal pact must be made, the Joint Chiefs oppose the inclusion in the pact of any reference to military plans, planning, or organizations therefore. For example, Article VIII of the draft treaty… is unacceptable from the military point of view, since this Article would permit the Pacific Council to demand knowledge of and to participate in planning by the North Atlantic Organization and the Organization of American States, and vice versa".4
1Memorandum by Satterthwaite (BNA) of conversation between Franks and Dulles, Mar.30, 1951, secret; memorandum by Allison of conversation among Franks, Rusk, and Dulles, Apr. 5, 1951, secret. 2Dulles, draft memorandum for the President, undated, secret. 3Dulles, draft press statement by the President, Apr. 6, 1951 4Bradley to Marshall, memorandum, Apr. 11, 1951, top secret.
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These views were endorsed by the Department of Defense on April 13.1
It was Dulles' view that the United States could make it clear to Australia and New Zealand that any organization set up under the trilateral arrangement "will not have the right to demand knowledge of and participate in planning by the North Atlantic Organization, the Organization of American States or any other security organization not directly related to the Pacific area." He therefore redrafted the proposed Presidential statement so as to omit reference to consultation and planning with nations and regional associations of which the three signatories might be members.2
On the same date, April 13, Spender sent a message to Dulles urging that a statement be issued concerning the scope of the Canberra arrangements along the following lines: (1) these would be of a formal character although a treaty identical with the North Atlantic Pact to which there would be a large number of signatories was not envisaged: (2) while no elaborate organization was envisaged, the arrangements provided for "consultative machinery through which the parties could concert their policies and planning"; and (3) no final decision had been reached as to the parties to be included in the arrangements.3
To this message Dulles replied on the same day, reserving the position of the United States with respect to detailed drafting of the tripartite pact, principally Article VIII, which, he said, seemed too broad in implying active military planning coordinated with that under the Rio Pact or the North Atlantic Treaty and which would be impractical and was beyond the power of the United States alone to assure. Dulles expressed confidence, however, that the Australians would "find acceptable such language revisions not affecting fundamentals".4
In reply, Spender advised Dulles that with respect to Article VIII the matter the Australian Government did not regard the point mentioned by Dulles as a vital matter and that he "need anticipate no difficulty in our reaching agreement with you on matters that do not affect the basic substance of the treaty". Spender added that, although his Government would wish to see the actual text of any proposed amendments and to reserve the right to make counter-suggestions, he was "completely confident" that agreement could be reached "on such comparatively minor matters". At the same time Spender expressed Australia's acceptance of the proposed Presidential statement but said that the statement was interpreted in Canberra "as preliminary to a final agreement on the precise terms of a treaty along the basic lines of the Canberra draft".5
1Marshall to Acheson, letter, Apr. 13, 1951, top secret. 2Dulles to Acheson, memorandum, Apr. 13, 1951, secret. 3Spender to Dulles, message, Apr. 13, 1951, top secret. 4To Canberra, tel. 276, Apr. 13, 1951, secret 5Spender to Dulles, message, Apr. 16, 1951, top secret.
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Meanwhile, the New Zealand Ambassador in Washington, Sir Carl Berendsen, had been advised by Assistant Secretary Rusk that, in view of the British position and the expressed preference of Australia and New Zealand in the matter, the United States was going ahead with the tripartite pact without the Philippines but wished to make it clear that the United States was simply according to Australia and new Zealand a status and commitments equivalent to those already possessed by the Philippines.1 A similar statement was made to Sir Oliver Franks, who was told also that the United States considered it inadvisable to attempt to coordinate the planning under the ANZUS pact with that under such security arrangements as the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty, with which it had no real connection. If as a result of talks with Australia and New Zealand, Franks was informed, it seemed desirable that the United Kingdom be brought in in some way as an observer or consultant with respect to the tripartite agreement, the United States would have no objection.2
The Pentagon cleared the revised draft Presidential statement on April 17 and President Truman issued it the following day. Referring to the proposed ANZUS Treaty, the President stated that it would "establish consultation to strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid", and that this and other security arrangements with Japan and the Philippines constituted "natural initial steps in the consolidation of peace in that area".3
Further comments from the joint Chiefs with reference to the draft tripartite treaty were submitted by the Department of Defense to the Department of State on April 19. The Joint Chiefs still found objectionable Article Articles VII and VIII of the draft treaty and expressed the desire that "there be no reference of any nature in any new security arrangements with nations of the Pacific Islands other than Japan (if such arrangements must eventuate) to military plans, planning, or organizations therefor". Furthermore, they stated that they "would find serious objection to including openly in a treaty any requirement for the establishment of a military planning organization with Australia and New Zealand and for any formal military planning among the Pacific Island nations".4
Informally General Hamblen suggested that (1) "Article VII of the draft treaty would become satisfactory if the phrase 'and set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to accomplish its purpose' were deleted"; (2) since there appeared to be no way to change Article VIII to make it satisfactory, its elimination appeared desirable; and (3) the Council established by Article VII should be a political council, which, while not precluding a military 1Memorandum by Allison of conversation among Berendsen , Rusk, and Allison, Apr. 13, 1951, secret. 2Memorandum by Allison of conversation among Franks, Rusk, and Allison, Apr. 14, 1951, secret 3 Department of State Bulletin. Apr. 30, 1951, p. 699 4Marshall to Acheson, letter, Apr. 19, 1951, top secret, with attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense, Apr. 17, 1951, top secret.
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adviser to the United States representative, "would not contemplate combined planning between or among military advisers".1
In order to meet the objections of the Joint Chiefs with respect to Articles VII and VIII Dulles entered into discussions with Berendsen and with Spender, who had recently been appointed Australian Ambassador to the United States. Tentative agreement was reached on June 25 that reference to "subsidiary bodies" would be omitted from Article VII and that the purpose should be to have an essentially political Council, although that body would be master of its own procedure and should be able to do whatever it found necessary to accomplish its purposes. Article VII was modified in such a way that it omitted all reference to coordination of the Council's planning "with that of other regional organizations and associations of States of which one or more of the Parties are members". With the introduction of new preliminary language, Article VIII was then tentatively agreed upon as follows:
"Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area and the development by the United Nations of effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States, or other authorities in a position to further the purpose of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific Area."
Dulles noted that it was believed that the revised text fully met the considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that, in view of the anxiety of Australia and New Zealand concerning Iran, the text should be promptly initialed.2 By June 30 both New Zealand and Australia had accepted the new wording of Articles VII and VIII.3
Dulles informed Secretary Marshall of the redrafting of the two articles in a letter dated June 27, 1951. He stated that (1) it had been pointed out to the Australian and New Zealand Ambassadors that "consultation would normally be through diplomatic channels, and that the United States was not prepared to commit itself, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Rio Pact or as a prospective party to a security agreement with Japan, to consultation by these associations with the tripartite council"; (2) the
1Hamblem to Allison, memorandum, May 15,1951, top secret 2Memorandum by Dulles of conversation with Spender and Berendsen, June 25, 1951, top secret. 3Memorandum by Babcock (Defense) of conversation with Corner (New Zealand Embassy), June 30, 1951, top secret.
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language of the treaty as redrafted reflected "the view that the Council will not engage in military planning but will be a simple and compact body, composed of high level personnel"; and (3) the opening phrase of the redrafted Article VIII referring to the possible "development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of effective means to maintain international peace and security" were added in deference to what seemed to be the views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (which had been consulted informally) and also to further reinforce the President's statement on April 18 that the contemplated security arrangements were only "initial steps".1
In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on July 9, the Joint Chiefs indicated their continued dissatisfaction with the two articles in question, reaffirming their previous position with respect to Article VII that they considered it preferable, from a military point of view, to exclude all references to the creation of any formalized body such as the proposed Council. The Joint Chiefs further indicated that a new concept had been written into Article VIII, which made it possible for the Pacific treaty nations, the North Atlantic Treaty nations, and the members of the Organization of American States to assume the status of a federation of states, within which there was to be set up machinery for a wide variety of actions, including military planning and collaboration. The Joint Chiefs stated that they viewed these developments with concern because: (1) it would require the establishment of a new military agency under the Pacific Council, which was objectionable from the military point of view; (2) the actions flowing from the new concept within Article VIII would tend to reduce, without compensating advantage, United States military freedom of action; and (3) there was considerable likelihood that Australia and New Zealand would become so involved in military problems in the Pacific as a whole as to be reluctant to fulfill their military responsibilities to the British Commonwealth.
In view of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the proposed Article VII be deleted and that the proposed Article VIII be further redrafted so as to limit its scope to provision for the entry of additional members and the incorporation of the substance of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty (providing for accession to the treaty by new members). The Joint Chiefs' redraft of Article VIII read as follows:
"In order to provide a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area, the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other Pacific state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the Pacific Area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may
1Dulles to Marshall, letter, June 27, 1951, top secret.
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Become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of Australia. The Government of Australia will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession."1
Dulles pointed out in a memorandum the next day that (1) without the establishment of a Council as provided under Article VII there would be no consultation as specified in the President's statement of April 18, which had been approved by the Department of Defense; (2) Article VII had been redrafted to omit reference to the setting up of "subsidiary bodies" because the Joint Chiefs thought that this phrase smacked of military planning; (3) Article VIII had been redrafted to meet certain essential political objectives, omitting any reference to the planning to which the Joint Chiefs had originally objected; and (4) pending the realization of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific the members of the tripartite Council were merely "authorized" (but not required, as had been the case, at least by implication, in the earlier draft) to consult with other States and associations with interests in the security of the Pacific.2
VI. Initializing, Signature, and Entry into Force of the Treaty
The draft ANZUS Treaty, including the redrafted Articles VII and VIII as agreed upon on June 25, was initialed in Washington on July 12, 1951 by Dulles, Spender, and Berendsen. On this occasion Dulles pointed out that the tripartite treaty was one of a series of arrangements being worked out by the United States to strengthen security in the Pacific and that these arrangements were, "in turn, as the President said in his April 19 [April 18] statement only 'initial steps'" and that it was expected that "in due course, these initial steps will be followed by others in order to achieve what the preamble and Article VIII of the draft treaty describes as 'the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area'". Spender observed that the draft agreement was 'but one but nonetheless an exceedingly important step in building up the security of the Pacific area."3.
No changes in the draft Treaty were made before its signature at San Francisco on September 1, 1951. On that occasion Secretary Acheson observed that the United States hoped to make the Treaty, together with the United States-Philippines mutual defense treaty and the post-treaty arrangements with Japan, the basis for peace in the Pacific. Ambassador Berendsen referred
1Bradley to Marshall, memorandum, July 9, 1951, top secret. 2Dulles, draft memorandum, July 10, 1951, no classification indicated. 3Department of State Bulletin, July 23, 1951, p. 147.
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to the fact that the tripartite pact did not restrict itself to its parties alone, but contemplated "close and constant consultation with others of like interest or in like peril". Ambassador Spender noted that the tripartite treaty did more than express formally the close ties of comradeship between the parties, and marked "the first step in building of the ramparts of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific Ocean". He added that the treaty, "directed to regional security in the Pacific", took the "first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening system of peaceful security in the vital area". 1
President Truman, at a speech at San Francisco on September 4, 1951, repeated that the series of Pacific treaties were "initial steps toward the consolidation of peace in the Pacific". Testifying at hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles likewise emphasized that further developments for the security of the Pacific area were anticipated, but stated that the problem then was the consolidation of the results already achieved, including ratification of the security treaties then before the Senate, and that there was no plan to set up a Pacific counterpart of NATO.
The Senate having given its advice and consent to the ratification of the ANZUS Treaty, it was ratified by the United States on April 15, 1952. It entered into force on April 29, 1952.
1Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 24, 1951, pp. 495-497.