DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: July 28, 1952
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Hans Hedtoft The Secretary of State
Also Present: Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Ambassador Mr. Bonbright, EUR
COPIES TO: S/S, BNA, GER
Mr. Hedtoft, former Danish Prime Minister and leader of the Danish Social Democratic party came to see me at 3 o'clock this afternoon accompanied by the Danish Ambassador. After the customary exchange of greetings, I asked Mr. Hedtoft for his views on the current situation in Europe. He replied without hesitation that he regarded the German question as presenting the biggest problem at this time. He spoke at some length regarding Schumacher whom he described as a "problem child" although he had no doubt of Schumacher's anti-Communist sentiments. He did not conceal the fact that Schumacher was disappointed with the United States and expressed the view that this feeling had its origin in the treatment which Schumacher allegedly received in the 1945 and 1946 at the hands of "certain American Generals."
According to Mr. Hedtoft, European workers have the impression that the US is pushing too hard and too fast in its efforts to obtain the rearmament of Western Germany. In his view the workers wish to be absolutely certain that no stone has been left unturned to make possible unification of Germany and to avoid the permanent lowering of the Iron Curtain between the Soviet and Western zones which the feel
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will eventually lead to war. He made it clear that he himself was sure on this point but that others were not. In reply, I explained to him that my chief concern was that unless the present opportunity is seized and pushed through to a successful conclusion, we will lose our momentum with the consequent permanent loss of all our hopes for the integration of Western Europe, including Germany. If we do not get the EDC Treaty and German conventions buttoned up by the end of this year, we may be faced with difficult problems in Italy, France and Western Germany next year with the possibility of strong Communist gains. Mr. Hedtoft said that he too was extremely worried over the Communist situation in Italy. He did not however feel that it was a serious problem in Western Germany.
Turning to the question of the attitude of the Socialists in general, I told Mr. Hedtoft that I was fully aware of his own attitude and that of his party in Denmark, which was most helpful. I could not help but be concerned however by the attitude of many of the Socialists in France, Schumacher in Germany and Bevan in Great Britain. It seemed to me that policies which these people were following were playing into the hands of the Russians and I asked Mr. Hedtoft how he thought this problem could be dealt with. He did not answer my question directly but spoke rather of the lack of understanding of the European workers for the United States. He indicated that this was a two-way matter and that many US officials abroad did not understand European Socialism. He said that European workers were also worried about our policies in other parts of the world notably with respect to Chiang-Kai-Shek and Franco. He also mentioned the difficulties which were caused by some of our tariff policies. In the latter connection, he said that he had great difficulty in arguing with Danish Communists, many of whom were able men. The Communists had professed to express gratification for Marshall Plan help but would point to Danish unemployment and say that if they worked for the Russians they would all have jobs, whereas if they worked to sell their products to the US, the latter would keep their products out by means of the tariff.
In reply to this kind of attack, Mr. Hedtoft said that he told the workers that if they worked for the Russians, they would work in Siberia but that this did not really meet the problem. I told him that I could take no exception to his criticism on this score since this was a matter on which we were constantly using our influence, particularly with the Congress. I added that I had hopes that when Congress
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reconvenes next January, we would be in a position to place the whole picture to them in one frame. By showing them the picture in this way, we hoped to avoid the present piece-meal approach which leads to so much more difficulty and undermining of our overall policies.
In conclusion, Mr. Hedtoft stated that he had learned a great deal about the US in the course of his three weeks' visit and would return to Denmark to pursue his greatest aim which was understanding between European workers and liberal Americans.
Dean Acheson
EUR:JCHBonbright:bsm