DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: September 5, 1952
SUBJECT: Tunisia
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy Mr. van Laethem, First Secretary, French Embassy Mr. Knight - WE Mr. Utter - AF
COPIES TO: S/S Amembassy, London NEA Amembassy, Paris UNA Amlegation, Tangier WE Amconsul, Rabat AF Amconsul, Tunis DRN Amconsul, Casablanca DRW
Mr. Bonnet referred to recent events in Tunisia and pointed out that the Bey and his Nationalist advisers remain faithful to the delaying tactics which they already adopted sometime ago. He remarked that the Tunisians still have illusions regarding the results which might be expected from a United Nations intervention and they therefore are decided to avoid any agreement and to maintain a state of agitation in order to create a favorable climate to the Nationalists' abusive tirades in New York.
He noted that these illusions with regard to the UN unfortunately stem from, among other things, the attitude of the United States in this matter.
The remarks made by Mr. Gross in New York have in fact been interpreted as a change in the Department's position on two principal points.
On the one hand, in speaking of "real representatives" of the people the Deputy Delegate of the United States gave the impression that he disapproved of the Baccouche experiment, despite the fact that it was undertaken with the formal and repeated assent of the Bey, and that he considered moreover Messrs. Chenik and Bourghiba as the real spokesmen of the Tunisian people. On the other hand, in expressing the hope that a "constructive solution" might result from the debates in New York, Mr. Gross appeared to recognize the right of the UN General Assembly not only to discuss the question
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substantively but also to recommend to the parties the course to follow.
He pointed out to me that, while giving the Nationalists a weighty argument for their propaganda, which they had not hesitated to exploit immediately, these unfortunate declarations also aroused grave concern in French opinion which had been echoed by the press. He referred to Mr. Colonna's indignant declaration and declared that reactions of this kind would not be lacking from other quarters if the State Department did not correct the disastrous impression created by the words of its representative in new York.
I admitted that the statement of Mr. Gross had been unfortunate and stated that the conclusions which the French press had drawn from them were without foundation. The United States Government, I added, is aware of the necessity of supporting France in the coming debate. As soon as the French Government has decided on its position we should study together the questions of procedure and tactics so that a fruitful collaboration might be established between our delegations. An attempt should be made to discourage any unjustified hopes of Tunisian and Moroccan Nationalists and to make possible bilateral negotiations.
Mr. Bonnet reverting to the statements made in New York, underlined the fact that if one considered the "real representatives" of the people to be those who make the most noise and resort to the use of dynamite, one would be building up "Mossadeghs", who would become prisoners of ignorant people from whom they could not escape. He pointed out that if France had followed this course in Indo-China the latter would undoubtedly be Communist at the present time.
He expressed the opinion that in the Middle East and Africa the Communist tactic seems more and more to be aiming at, in its first phase, the elimination of European and American influence; in the second, the progressive weakening of young nations by playing up extreme nationalism which leads to economic retrogression and to the flight of capital and; finally, in the third phase of the seizing of power, thanks to the poverty- stricken state of the people.
I admitted that this tactic, covert though it be, was undeniable and that this was a problem which we should study together one day.
In referring to discussions which took place in Paris on the 28th of May regarding the United States policy with regard to North Africa, Mr. Bonnet reminded me of my promise to consider making a statement and underlined the importance which such a statement by me would have at this time.
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I queried whether this statement would be able to have a real influence on the Bey. I was not certain, furthermore, that it would be opportune to disclose arguments which we might have to present in November. I considered that it might not be judicious to give ammunition to adversaries of the Administration and run the risk of introducing polemics which might be prejudicial to France. I recognized, however, that it was important for France that the impression created by the statements made in New York be corrected and I asked Mr. Bonnet to give me a few days to consider the matter before letting him know what I might be able to do in this connection. I remarked, however, that for the moment I could see no opportunity for making a statement.
It was suggested that the opportunity might be given if France made known that it would not oppose the question of inscription on the UN agenda. Mr. Bonnet emphasized that this would be entering a vicious circle for the French Government could not think of deciding its position before having obtained a formal promise of support from the United States.
Mr. Bonnet insisted that if the present misunderstandings were not removed the French Government might be forced by its public opinion to assume a stiffer attitude which might be extremely embarrassing not only with respect to the questions which will be raised in the United Nations but also for the settlement of numerous problems which are pending between France and the United States in North Africa. It was necessary in his opinion to establish an atmosphere of confidence in Franco-American relations on the subject.
I promised to give serious thought to this problem and would try to find a formula which might satisfy the French request.
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