DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: September 30, 1952
SUBJECT: Iran and Egypt
PARTICIPANTS: Sir Oliver Franks - British Ambassador The Secretary Mr. Byroade
COPIES TO: S/S EUR -Mr. Bonbright S/P - Mr. Nitze GTI NE
Sir Oliver Franks called on me at 3:30 today at his request. The following subjects were discussed:
Iran . Sir Oliver indicated that he had received an additional message from the Foreign Office which he wished to give to Byroade and myself on the question of the US-UK response to Mosadeq's reply. The message he handed us contained nothing really new in that it reiterated a strong feeling held in London that the reply to Mosadeq should be a joint one and should bring Mosadeq back to our original offer.
Sir Oliver indicated that he thought any difference of opinion between us on Iran was really part and parcel of a general difference of views on the developments in the Middle East. He thought we were inclined to treat the Iranian problem as one of the symptoms of a general trend of revolution and change in the Middle East. He stated that he believed the United States felt it best to "play along" with such developments in an effort to attempt to guide them in the right direction and the U.K., as he saw it, was adopting a more conservative approach. He stated he thought we should look upon the Iranian problem as a more specialized problem and strongly urged upon us to join in a joint reply to Mosadeq for the reasons stated in the British message.
I indicated that I agreed in general with what Sir Oliver had said but that I thought we were looking at the Iranian problem on its own merits. I said that I thought we should all realize that Mosadeq had gotten himself into a position from which apparently he could not retreat. I doubted that Mosadeq could even accept a solution along the lines of his own counter- proposals if Britain would agree thereto. The extreme elements surrounding him made it impossible for him to arrive at any agreement on a governmental level as this would result in his downfall. Under these conditions I indicated that I saw no profit arising from the British line of causing Mosadeq to face up squarely again to our original proposal. I said I had some views
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as to how this matter should be handled but that I wanted to get the President's approval before discussing them with Sir Oliver. I stated that I doubted if my views would be well received in London.
Egypt. I told Sir Oliver briefly about the informal "feeler" that we had received about ten days ago from General Naguib and his desire for closer cooperation with the United States and for "financial and military assistance". Sir Oliver sated that as he had been away from the office he was not current on Egyptian problems.
I indicated that I felt a response from the US was called for and that as some time had already elapsed we were rather eager to get on with it. I summarized for Sir Oliver the main points of the draft instructions to Caffrey as to his reply. I told Sir Oliver that I wished to hold up Caffrey's action until we had received the views of the British as well as those of Caffrey. Sir Oliver stated he would transmit our message to the Foreign Office without delay.
Byroade stated that the Foreign Office would be familiar with this matter. We had told the British Embassy in Cairo of the approach from the Egyptians at the time it was made and that Wells Stabler had just recently spent considerable time with Foreign Office officials as to the nature of the U.S. response. In answer to a general remark by Sir Oliver that there seemed to be a considerable gap in our approach to the Egyptian problem, Byroade stated that he felt this gap had been reduced considerably in the last couple of weeks and that a joint appreciation had been made in Cairo which indicated that encouragement and cooperation should be forthcoming from the US and UK to Naguib's regime.
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