Draft memorandum covering meeting of Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett, General Bradley, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Mike Pearson, Ambassador Gross, accompanied by Mr. A. A. Duff, Mr. Jeffery Kitchen, Col. Matthews, Mr. Rae.
Secretary Acheson opened the meeting by saying it was just as well to get right down to cases on the subject at hand. He said the JCS had looked over the Menon draft proposal and that Mr. Lovett and General Bradley would speak on three principal points which the JCS had indicated were essential to a consideration of the proposal. These were (1) there should be no forcible repatriation and this should be clearly stated in the body of the resolution; (2) the umpire should be a member of the Commission and the draft should be cleaned up to indicate a definite time limit for the retention of prisoners and an alternative choice--i.e., a second door; (3) it should be understood that the resolution, if and when passed, would constitute a recommendation to General Clark and that it would be up to him to implement the details involved.
Secretary Lovett then set forth the view of the Defense Department. Mr. Lovett said the Menon proposal was unacceptable because it did not provide sufficient safeguard for the welfare of UN troops in Korea. It contained hazards which were unacceptable and left aside some of the basic commitments which we had made. It was very fuzzy on points required to provide adequate safeguards for the troops if there should be a breach of the armistice. He considered an acceptance of the Menon proposal would be an avoidance of our responsibilities and that the military judgment would be
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to oppose the proposal. He said there was an erroneous assumption and that was related to the fact that the prisoner of war question is not the only unresolved point. Our acceptance of several other points have been made conditional on our acceptance of the non-forcible repatriation point. He said it was a bitter task to read the messages day after day setting forth the account of the truce negotiations at Panmunjom and that we must be clear in the future course we are to follow. If the Communists want an honorable peace they can get it, but it would be unthinkable for us to make a peace possible through surrender of principles.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd asked what agreements were pending in addition to the non- forcible repatriation item. Mr. Acheson said that the matter of air fields was not mentioned in the present armistice agreement and the question of a Soviet member of the Commission had been set aside on the understanding that it would not be made an issue if the Communists agree on non-forcible repatriation. This was the "package deal." He said he wanted to make it plain that we know that the prisoner issue created a military hazard.
Mr. Lovett said it was essential that anyone examining the problem be aware of the stages the negotiations had come through and only then could he get the full implication. He said that the Unified Command could not accept the additional jeopardy which acceptance of the Menon resolution would bring. Mr. Gross remarked that the question of our safeguards in the 21- power resolution - 3 -
was to put additional pressure on the Communists. Mr. Lovett said that if anyone hoped through the elimination of pressures rather than the application of additional military pressure to bring about an armistice he thought he was quite wrong. He said that it had been the experience of Admirals Joy and Libby and our unit field commanders that the position of the Communists had only changed under the application of military force and that the Communists had even complained of military force in the course of the negotiations at the time that they were conceding points to us. He said however he believed it was possible to modify the Menon proposal in an attempt to meet our major problems and without giving up our main principles.
General Bradley referred to the three objectives in the minds of the military. He said that as drafted the Menon proposal did not present a clear picture and that if it was not clear and if there was not a clear armistice, the question would then arise as to when one could invoke the greater sanction. A second point was the security of United Nations forces. He said if the Communists continue a major build-up, this would be dangerous and they would also have unlimited access for propaganda and infiltration. Conversely, we would have no pressure against them because a major factor in our favor would be eliminated when our air pressure came off. He said that he was setting forth this position not because he did not want an armistice but rather because he wanted a definite one. Once the fight had stopped, it would be hard to get our people to go back into action.
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With respect to the Menon proposal, if the prisoners were kept incarcerated, this amounted to forcible repatriation because after several years the probability was that they would break down and indicate a desire to return to the homeland. This was clearly not in accordance with our principle. The third military point was that the resolution should be passed in the General Assembly and then passed to Panmunjom, and would be implemented by the Unified Command as to detail. With respect to prisoners who would not accept repatriation, he thought that there should be no future General Assembly responsibility for the prisoners and that they should be disposed of, i.e., released, and that the provision in this regard was much too fuzzy.
Mr. Lovett said the attitude of the U.S. Government was not just the attitude of this administration alone. He recalled the petition which had been signed by sixty senators, led by Senator Jenner, calling upon the Government to refuse forcible repatriation. He said the Menon proposal would be forcing the marginal prisoners into a compound from which there was only one exit - to the north. Under these circumstances it was a major problem whether we could get the prisoners to the compound when they realized it was a one-way street. He wondered whose face was being saved, and made the remark that regardless of the answer to that, it was our body that was being placed in jeopardy.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that the British point of view was different - that like it or not, they felt it highly desirable to get the Indian resolution passed if possible. He said that he had spent many
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hours with Menon and the two large points mentioned had, he thought, been agreed. The first of these was that reference to the fact that force should not be used was now contained in the body of the resolution. This point the Chinese would not like and they would turn it down. The second point as set forth in Menon's paragraph 12 as now written indicated that disagreements should go to negotiation here in the GA or in the Commission as an instrument of the GA. He said that, of course, it was the third point which was embodied in paragraph 16 and that he was not satisfied that it showed another way (i.e., a second door) out of the repatriation camp. He thought that, therefore, it was essential that tactics to get a change in this paragraph be used. Mr. Lovett interjected that the Secretary of State had had his staff look it over and that they had a formula which might be considered. Mr. Lloyd continued that Menon had said that his paragraph 16 was a way to the Mexican and Peruvian proposals. General Bradley said that it must be made clear that it was impossible to wait for a political settlement of the prisoner of war issue and that the GA or the Commission must do this. Mr. Lloyd remarked that one way might be to transfer the body of prisoners to a real neutral. General Bradley replied that the problem is the Chinese prisoners. The North Koreans would be absorbed in South Korea but no nation could absorb 15,000 Chinese - the number estimated to be involved who would not accept repatriation without access to force - without upsetting its economy.
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Mr. Pearson said that in one Menon draft it had been indicated that the Commission should make a recommendation to the General Assembly as to what should be done. Mr. Lovett asked why not release the prisoners after a reasonable period of time. Mr. Pearson said that Menon did not want to include this in his proposal, and he wondered what exit there could be if we did not get agreement on this point‚ - (he implied that they would be better off under those circumstances then if there were not armistice and all prisoners had to remain incarcerated.). Mr. Lovett replied that they were not in control and that we could release all those prisoners except those who wanted to go home. Mr. Pearson inquired if this might include sending some of the Chinese to Formosa and said that this could cause a very undesirable reaction. Mr. Lovett remarked that if the Indians would not buy the word "release", why could not the prisoners be "transferred" to a neutral.
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Pearson said that if Menon's resolution was introduced tomorrow it could be altered in Committee, but that this would probably happen in a way which would disassociate the Indians from it. Pearson added that he was surprised with regard to what Lovett had said with regard to other points still at issue.
The Secretary said again that there was nothing in the armistice regarding the airfields or Soviet participation on the Commission, and that this was part of a package deal, the third factor in which was non-forcible repatriation. Mr. Pearson inquired whether this meant that, if there was acceptance of non-forcible repatriation, you could accept the other points. Mr. Lovett replied that everyone has assumed that the two preceding points were settled but actually they were adopted conditional to the acceptance of a third point - it was all part of a package.
Mr. Pearson remarked that Menon's paragraph 8 constituted a capitulation by him in that a reference to a non-forcible repatriation was included in the body of the resolution. In its present form it did recognize the principle of non-forcible repatriation. Mr. Lovett said that he had not seen this, Ambassador Gross said that this had been left out
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in the copy telegraphed to Washington because Menon had not had it included in the draft in the first instance, and when challenged regarding it had said it was through a typographical error.
Mr. Pearson said that, since there was a reference in the draft, why did the marginal prisoners create an additional hazard to that that would exist if the armistice were concluded without this being finally settled. Mr. Lovett replied that the resolution ought to be so simple that the world at large would recognize its major provisions easily. It was now far too fuzzy. He said that General Clark had over 500,000 men for whose safety he was responsible. The South Koreans were bitter enough regarding our seeking an armistice without pressing for a military decision and that incidents would easily occur. It would be hard to identify what would constitute an incident calling for the application of the greater sanction. We want a clear example of the action which will allow us to apply a greater sanction. Mr. Lloyd said that if there were bad faith in the armistice the Communists could tie us up anyhow and could attack at any time, and that we were not, in accepting Menon's solution, in his view, adding to our risk.
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Mr. Lovett said that he thought the difference was not in the fact of the second door in the Menon draft but in the clarity of the existence of the second door. He said that Rhee and many other Koreans would love to cause trouble and, the foggier a resolution the unified command had to work with, the easier this would be. Selwyn Lloyd replied that the reason that the Menon draft was not clear was that the author wanted the Chinese to agree to it. He thought the thing to do was to get the Indians to admit that the principle of the second door was necessary through some maneuver. General Bradley asked what the purpose of an armistice was. He said that in the US Joint Chiefs' view it was to achieve peace and create an opportunity to pull our troops out. We had commitments for them elsewhere. We could not justify pulling them out on the basis of this fuzzy armistice. Mr. Pearson said that if under this fuzzy armistice we get the benefits we seek, haven't we achieved a lot. We would get our own men back. Secretary Acheson inquired "Do we?" He said that this is exactly the assurance that we are looking for in seeking a clear-cut armistice. If the Chinese Commander thinks there is any doubt about having us return additional prisoners, he will say he can't release men in his custody until he gets his own men back. The possibilities for confusion and deliberate
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torturing of the facts in this situation were readily apparent. Mr. Pearson inquired if a 90-day limit were in effect, would not they have to release all UN prisoners in their custody?
General Bradley said that with regard to the prisoners in our custody he felt strongly that if their position was not established in 90 days the UN must handle the prisoners and must arrange for their release. Lloyd said that it might be possible to negotiate Menon into accepting this principle. Lovett said that when the second door plan was set forth at Panmunjom in the form of a suggestion for a prisoner stockade with one door at the north and another at the south, the Reds screamed that they could not permit this. He added that they did not want to accept anything that gave their men freedom of choice. Lloyd said that he was impressed by the fact that we could not expect to afford the military risk unless we had at least reasonable security.
Secretary Acheson said that we had told these prisoners in honor and in conscience that we will not force them to return. Under these circumstances the prisoners when confronted with the idea of proceeding to a neutral zone for a new screening would decide to stay right where they were in the present camps. If, in accepting this agreement, we were accepting a responsibility to force them to proceed to the
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new Commission camp we would be at that juncture accepting a responsibility we have sworn not to carry out. This was the heart of the matter and there was little point in passing it off as "operational detail." Mr. Lloyd said that he presumed that difficulty would be eliminated if you were in a position to tell them they would be held for only 90 days and then released through a second door. Secretary Acheson then pointed out that retaining men for 90 days raised huge problems in terms of food, shelter, medicine, sanitation, et cetera, which the Commission in terms of its numbers could not hope to carry out from a physical standpoint in a very satisfactory and secure fashion. That we were considering undertaking a very risky business and were talking of proposing to do so against the background that when it came to the ultimate fate of these prisoners the Commies would never agree to our principle. Mr. Lovett said he thought the key was the release of these prisoners on an urgent basis as soon as they had been put through the new screening. If the Indian proposal was bona fide and if they wanted to settle this issue, they really should agree to prisoner release. The mechanics of any other course which included the detention of large numbers of prisoners for a period of 90 days was appalling. General Bradley said that he returned again to the idea that to turn them over to a UN agency was fine but there must be a specified time limit. Mr. Lovett remarked that
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there must be a light in the end of the tunnel or we could never get the prisoners to leave their present locations and enter the tunnel.
Mr. Lloyd said he thought that between us there was a unanimity of purpose all the way through but that there was a certain difference of opinion as to the usefulness of the Menon resolution and also as to the tactics we might employ. At this point Secretary Acheson asked "How important is Menon?" When Mr. Lloyd gave an ambiguous reply, Mr. Acheson said he thought the value of attempting to adopt his principles were illusory and that he thought that they would prove completely useless if we should have to use force. Mr. Lloyd said that Menon had now agreed to the statement of the non-forceful repatriation principle early in his resolution. Mr. Lovett said it was also important what language one would use. If we were agreed on the principle, then our difference is how clearly the resolution was stated, and we did prefer it to be clear, particularly with regard to the part specifying release. As he saw it, we would not get what we like; we would not get the Indians to go along with us, and we would not get the 52 votes which Mr. Lloyd seemed to think was our objective. General Bradley inquired how many people were willing, in Mr. Lloyd's estimation, to leave this question to a political conference. The Secretary interjected
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that he would not be content with that under any circumstance. He felt it was essential that a definite time be specified when the prisoners must be turned loose. He said the problem was not one of disposal or of care and maintenance. He pointed out that after all, we were caring for some 750,000 Arab refugees from Palestine; 25,000 would not be a problem in Korea. The North Koreans would fade into the population and that would leave only approximately 15,000 Chinese to deal with. He said a camp could easily be established where there was no guard but where the now free men could eat and sleep and that, though they could wander away, they would return to the camp when they got hungry enough. Selwyn Lloyd asked if this might involve a promise not to go to Formosa. Mr. Acheson implied that it would not involve any such promise; that in our contract with the prisoners we had only asked them to indicate that they would in the future follow peaceful pursuits. He said they should be let go to Formosa if they wanted to. Selwyn Lloyd asked what if Chang Kai-shek conscripted them. Secretary Acheson said he considered this another problem entirely and a similar question could be asked regarding their possible conscription into the Chinese Communist army. He went on to point out that all South East Asia has a vast population of Chinese running from Indochina, through Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma, and that absorption would not really be
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difficult. At the same time, he pointed out that they could not remain in any given community in Korea unless it was the wish of that community.
Mr. Lloyd said that sending them to Formosa was not what he would want. He inquired if they could not be sent to a UN camp. Mr. Acheson replied "Yes - as free men." He thought it was imperative that the 15,000 should not stay in or near the neutral zone for long. General Bradley said that this was an important point because there would be a great temptation to the Communist Commanders to break the armistice in order to recapture or kill as many of this group as possible. The Secretary said he wished to emphasize again that although living in this camp they would do so as free men.
Mr. Lloyd said that he thought the thing to do then was to entice the Indians on to an acceptance of our principles. Secretary Acheson said he thought it was important to see who was being enticed. He said certainly no decision with regard to principles was needed. Mr. Lovett inquired whether Menon wouldn't agree on a specific release time. Mr. Gross said that at one point in his drafting Mr. Menon had said that the Commission should be under no inhibitions to release the
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prisoners. He thought that when Menon had presented his draft to the Soviets he had told them that of course it was always possible that he would make changes in his draft. Secretary Acheson said that in fact Menon had tied his hands. Mr. Lloyd indicated that he thought it was still possible for Menon to achieve some changes without running into too much Soviet opposition. The Secretary stated that since General Bradley and Mr. Lovett had to leave very shortly he wanted to make certain that he understood the US Government position on this matter and that it be set forth clear in front of our Canadian and UK friends. As he understood it, there must first be no forcible repatriation and, secondly, the prisoners must be turned loose in a reasonable time. Mr. Lovett replied that this was absolutely right - there must be two doors in order that the prisoners could be turned loose and that force could not be used in their repatriation. Mr. Lloyd inquired whether the camp to be established could not be described as a close loose camp - that is that it would be under only casual observation. The Secretary reiterated that they would no longer be prisoners and could come and go as they wished.
The Secretary then inquired what the group thought we should do tactically. Should the 21-power resolution be overthrown? Mr. Gross said he thought it was highly desirable to stick to the 21-power resolution; that the Greeks and Turks and Colombians and others
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had very forcibly expressed themselves against any toying with Menon's ideas and against any concession regarding the principles set forth in the 21-power resolution. Gross said he thought that if Menon were to circulate the resolution many of the 21 sponsoring countries would say "the hell with it" and would inquire of the US when it was going to stop going up the garden path with Menon. As Mr. Gross saw it, the US had two alternatives. The first was to go back to the 21-power resolution and the second was to have somebody else introduce a "dry-cleaned" version of the Menon draft.
Mr. Lovett said that he wished to state to this clause that if something were not achieved beyond a moral victory in terms of unanimity on one side and a turndown by the Communists on the other, that alternatives, although distasteful were under consideration, since it was imperative that we have a design for a future course of action. It was in the tradition of this country to fight only to a military stalemate. We had established the principle of collective security and we must preserve the principle of nonforceful repatriation. If in doing this, we could not achieve an honorable armistice then, while he was not a crystal ball
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gazer, he saw a strong probability that the US would seek a military conclusion.
Mr. Lloyd said that of course the US carried such a major load in terms of the UN action that US judgment must be decisive. He was appreciative of the US role and felt that his own in the premise might be considered little more than recommendations and counsel but that nevertheless he hoped that they would be given fair consideration. It was Mr. Lloyd's view that a re- enforcement of public opinion over the world and particularly in the UK was necessary, and that this could be achieved through a 52-nation resolution if the 52-nation resolution was turned down. Secretary Lovett said that if any government puts forward a proposal or plan in the hope that it will be turned down, it must in all responsibility have ready a course of action and must expect that it may be accepted. To do otherwise would be most dangerous and foolish and he thought that Lloyd would agree. Mr. Lloyd said that he did, but that he was looking forward to state two proposals which he thought would be very difficult in terms of finding a sizeable majority. He thought from the standpoint of UK public opinion that some maneuver of the kind he had discussed would be a helpful and useful thing. Mr. Lovett said that responsibility demanded that
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whatever was set forth would be livable if accepted, and Secretary Acheson added it has got to be right.
At this juncture Secretary Lovett and General Bradley left the meeting, Mr. Pearson having left some 10 minutes earlier in order to participate in a telecast.