UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
October 15th, 1952 (Typed Nov. 4, 1952)
SUBJECT: Ratification of the EDC
PARTICIPANTS: M. Bech, Foreign Minister, Luxembourg The Secretary Homer M. Byington, Jr.
COPIES TO: U.S. Delegation, 7th GA Department of State Mr. Ross Distribution to be determined by S/S Mr. Popper Mr. Taylor Secretary General Mr. Byington Reference.
During the course of a general preliminary conversation, M. Bech took occasion to remark on the reaction in Western Europe to the recent speech of Stalin and what appeared to be indications of a slightly less hostile attitude on the part of the Russians. He said that not only the people of Western Europe had a tendency to leap to conclusions over such developments but that even experienced politicians also were inclined to believe that the Russians were ready to undertake a rapprochement with the West. He said that he, himself, is not taken in by these developments but he feared a let-down in the Western European effort to achieve collective security.
M. Bech also mentioned his concern that the Russians might request the establishment of a legation in Luxembourg, particularly since the Luxembourg Minister was resident in Moscow and the Russian representation in Belgium was merely accredited to Luxembourg. He said that at the time when Western nations took measures to restrict the movement of Soviet diplomats he had pointed out to the Belgian Government the necessity of allowing the existence of a corridor for the Soviet diplomats to travel between Brussels and Luxembourg in order to avoid a Russian request for representation in Luxembourg itself. Of course, the problem of travel within Luxembourg did not exist because of the small size of his country. Now with the Russian interest in the Schuman Plan the Soviets might request establishment of a legation in Luxembourg. His remarks did not infer in any way displeasure that the Schuman Plan authority was in his country.
Following our preliminary conversation, I told M. Bech that I particularly
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wanted to discuss with him the prospects for an early ratification of the EDC. I said that we had understood the position of his Government to be that they would only ratify after both the Germans and French had ratified. We recognized the practical difficulties involved for Luxembourg in moving towards ratification before Belgium. We were fully aware of the existing complete economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg and also of the integration of their two military establishments. If, however, Belgium could see its way clear to ratify before the French, we would hope that Luxembourg could take action simultaneously with the Belgians. I particularly stressed the importance of early Luxembourg action and the influence it would have throughout Europe because of Bech's reputation as a "European" statesman and the respect in which he was universally held.
M. Bech's reaction was immediate. He shook his head and said that this would not be possible. It would be possible for him to propose such action to his Government, but he would not be followed. He pointed out that his Government was based on a coalition with the Socialists, and that it was with the greatest difficulty he had brought the Socialists along to the present extent in agreeing to Luxembourg's foreign policy. The Socialists in their campaign two years ago had promised the electorate that there would be no compulsory military service and had won two seats from the Communists. Today the Communists were accusing them of having lied to deceive the electorate because they now were agreeing to the current military service of 12 months. In this connection M. Bech emphasized that he had been able to persuade the Socialists to agree to the signing of the EDC only on the basis of a promise that he would make no commitments for Luxembourg with regard to military service without conferring with them and that he had inserted in the EDC agreement a clause providing that he would be able to consult with the European Minister of Defense and the Supreme Allied Commander on this question. The Socialists would be adamant in refusing to ratify the EDC unless and until the matter of military service had been fully established and agreed to among the countries involved. He pointed out the difficulties the Belgians had had in this regard a few months ago when they had had to reduce their military service to 18 months. He did not foresee for the present any general agreement with the other governments and the Supreme Allied Commander of the NATO forces on the duration of compulsory military service.
In any event, neither M. Bech's party nor the Socialists would ever agree to ratification until after the French and Germans. This would be true also of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. He was slightly critical of the Italians because of the De Gasperi visit to Bonn, and the way it had been played up by the Germans. He felt this emphasis on Italo-German relations had made the French a little uneasy. Returning to Luxembourg ratification he said that Luxembourg had only four battalions and in making the commitment involved in the ratification of the EDC, it would not be possible for Luxembourg public opinion to accept a situation of alliance with the Germans before French ratification had been established. Likewise, the Belgian, Netherlands, and Italian Governments would be unable to enter into the EDC without it having already been established that France was committed and could be counted on as a counterpoise to the rapidly growing German strength. In this connection he
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mentioned his difficulties with the Luxembourg industrialists who had been opposed to the Schuman Plan. He said that it was only after French ratification was assured that he was able to convince the industrialists that there was no course for Luxembourg other than also to participate.
M. Bech then expressed considerable skepticism with regard to the possibilities of French ratification before next spring. He mentioned that M. Schuman's influence and prestige in the French Government was by no means what it had been a few months ago and he questioned how much longer M. Schuman might continue in office and how closely he was associated with the views and wishes of M. Pinay. He referred to his conversations with Schuman, DeGasperi and Eden in Strasbourg and said that the atmosphere over ratification of the EDC was just as gloomy as it was bright over the Schuman Plan. He expressed his regret at the general pessimism of his views and said that he felt that he had to speak with me in absolute frankness. These views represented his estimate of the situation in Europe today. There was always the possibility of change in a few months.
I said that he had always talked frankly with me and I fully appreciated the spirit of his conversation with me today. In any event we would have an opportunity to talk with M. Schuman when he comes here next month and explore the matter with him.
HMByington, Jr.