UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SECURITY INFORMATION
October 21, 1952
SUBJECT: Secretary Acheson's Conversations with Foreign Ministers of the NEA Area During the 7th General Assembly of the United Nations
PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Mohamed Fadil Jamali Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq The Secretary Mr. Plitt, US Delegation
1. Foreign Affairs
Upon being received by the Secretary this afternoon at 4:30, Dr. Al-Jamali beamed with pleasure at the opportunity to have a private conversation with his host and lost no time in launching into a general tour d'horizon of foreign and domestic affairs as they affected the Arab world in general and Iraq in particular.
Al-Jamali pointed up his trip through the Middle East, Egypt, etc. in late summer and referred to the statement on Arab foreign policy objectives he made during the Arab League caucus in Cairo in which he said: The Arabs could not join the Soviet bloc because Communism would destroy their national and religious aspirations; the West has principles closer to the Arab countries; in the event of war, the Arab states could not remain neutral because of their oil resources, etc. He recited the six points which
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he declared were the basis of his foreign policy. These briefly were outlined as follows:
1. Arabs to be treated as equals by the Western world. 2. Immediate solution of the Palestine question as decided by the UN. 3. North African liberation. 4. The West should not put obstacles in the way of Arab unity. 5. The West should give Arabs economic and cultural aid. 6. The West should give Arabs military aid.
He elaborated to some extent on the foregoing but in essence his further comments leaned heavily on his six-point outline with which, he said, not all Arab statesmen are fully in agreement. Each one, he explained, pursues his own ideas with, nevertheless a certain measure of solidarity of views becoming increasingly evident. The collective Arab approach toward East- West problems is developing and it is something which the Western powers, particularly the colonial powers should not underestimate.
2. Domestic Situation
In referring to Iraq's domestic situation, Dr. Al-Jamali said that it was fraught with a certain measure of increasing political unrest. He described the forthcoming Parliamentary elections as necessitated by the changing internal political situation in Iraq demanding reforms, and explained that the opposition party was clamoring for the institution of direct elections which he feels might bring in undesirable elements, some of which could conceivably fall under the control of under-cover Communists. To avoid this and other undesirable factors, which he did not stop to describe, the existing system of elections is deemed preferable which makes it possible to have elected those elements of the body politic which could be more certainly depended upon to pursue an effective clean-up in government.
The Secretary voiced the hope that the internal stability of Iraq, which in the past has been a mainstay among the Middle East governments, might continue and that the forthcoming elections would procure the beneficial results desired.
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3. MEDO
Al-Jamali referred to the Western powers' plans and efforts at developing a Middle East defense organization and explained that the original proposal had been ill-received because ill-timed and because it had failed to take into consideration some of the overriding problems facing the Middle East countries in developing among themselves a system of adequate defense. He listed as factors to be taken into consideration the poor resources of the Arab states which had not even the wherewithal adequately to defend their own frontiers. He emphasized that manpower was not lacking but that the materiel to make that manpower effective is sorely needed. He said that in existing circumstances no leader in those countries would dare commit their defense forces for services outside their own countries. It is even questionable as to whether they would be willing to allow an interchange of such forces among the Arab states. Al-Jamali wanted arms for Iraq which he described as being the most vulnerable of the Arab states, explaining that the Russians could sweep around Turkey into Iraq and gain direct access to the eastern Mediterranean across Syria. If Iraq had received economic and military aid similar to what had been given to Turkey, Iraq's vast manpower could have been developed into an effective force of defense of this area. The Secretary told Al-Jamali that Iraq had been declared eligible for cash reimbursable aid under section 408(E) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program of 1949, as amended, and that he believed that the draft text of notes were being sent to our Embassy in Baghdad for exchange with the Iraq Government to cover the agreement. He said that this was in itself recognition by the United States of the important role Iraq plays in the defense of the Middle East. Al-Jamali expressed ignorance of this development but seemed pleased to hear it.
4. Palestine
The discussion would have been incomplete without an allusion by Al-Jamali to Israel as the source of all ME trouble and turmoil. Without an acceptable solution of the Palestine problem, Al-Jamali said, there could be no lasting tranquility in that area. He said, however, that during his recent trip to Egypt and other Arab states he heard some of their leaders mention for the first time, sotto-voce of course, the advisability of beginning to pay some heed to compliance with UN resolutions, no matter how distasteful they may be. This, however, he carefully underscored must be considered as merely the germination of a possible calmer and more realistic
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assessment of the issues involved and a more practical approach to this great problem. He held out no hope, however, that this would lead to a change of policy in regard to Palestine in the foreseeable future. So long as the refugee situation was allowed to continue, no mutually satisfactory solution of the tense political situation surrounding Palestine could be expected.
5. Communism
Time and again Al-Jamali reverted to the danger of Communism to the Middle East. There are three types to be feared. He enumerated them as follows:
(a) the inroads of commie propaganda into the native population made possible principally because of their existing misery and sub-standard of living. This, he said, could be overcome by bettering their living conditions;
(b) the dangerous infiltration of Communist ideologists who through devious ways were endeavoring to warp the minds, particularly of the middle class. The method employed by them is to stir up the hatred of colonial domination directed principally against the UK and France and the United States because of the support the French and British derive from us. Russia, he said, had never appeared in a role of a colonial power. Hence, Russia is not to be feared. Clever commie propaganda supports belligerent nationalism and xeno-phobia, the bad effects of which the Western powers are harvesting because of their seeming inability to counteract this nefarious commie influence with dynamic counter-propaganda.
(c) the professional traitors and saboteurs who are not always easy to uncover but when caught can be neutralized by imprisonment or other means of elimination.
6. Tunisia
The exchange of views between the Secretary and Al-Jamali finally reached the topic of Tunisia. The Secretary carefully outlined our thinking on the subject and expressed the hope that the Arab-Asian group would weigh carefully the advantages to be gained in channeling this issue with the French into an unemotional and constructive discussion. It was emphasized to Al-Jamali that the French had made it quite clear that they will not accept UN
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intervention in this problem and that if forced too hard either by efforts to adopt a strong resolution or the creation or establishment of any investigative bodies, such efforts would meet with immediate and energetic objection by the French and a stiffening French attitude in its policy toward Tunisia. Mr. Acheson emphasized also the critical political situation presently facing Mr. Schuman, who had already been blamed at home for a moderate attitude toward the North African issues. He also cautioned Al-Jamali to use his influence not to press too hard for an early taking up of the items on Tunisia and Morocco which the French desired to be deferred as long as possible, saying that he had learned that the French are quite satisfied with the Secretariat's listing of the item as fifth or sixth on the agenda.
Mr. Acheson took pains to impress upon Al-Jamali that Mr. Schuman's leading the French debate on these items would seem to be in the interests of all concerned. Without his presence the local French delegation could exert little effective responsibility in the handling of this issue as they might have no authority to take decisions and be dependent upon instructions cabled from Paris. With Mr. Schuman here it might be possible to work along with him to the end that the French might be induced to discuss the merits of the case and perhaps avoid the raising of the question of competence. Only with the French Foreign Minister present at the debate might this be possible. The Secretary recommended that the Arab-Asian group give serious thought to the end result that they wished to achieve and to mold their tactics with this in mind rather than risk the failure of their objective through an uncompromising attitude.
Al-Jamali listened attentively and while agreeing that to risk an outright rejection would accomplish nothing, asked for the Secretary's help in the cause the Arab-Asian group had sponsored.
7. The Power Void
Gradual elimination of British and French influence in the Middle East created a political void according to Al-Jamali. This "power void", as he calls it, cannot remain. Either it must be filled by the United States or it will be filled by the Russians. Iraq and the other Middle East states all tend to lean to the West and turn to it with hopeful expectation.
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This cannot, Al-Jamali said, continue indefinitely unless some more tangible efforts become apparent that America is willing to give the Arab states a more equitable ratio of help than they have received from us in the past. Israel, he reminded, has received more than a just share of such help. While Israel receives extensive financial and economic aid, the Arab states received promises. The Secretary explained to Al-Jamali the heavy burden already on American shoulders and the inability to give each the help they want. "We are doing all we possibly can and would do more if it were possible."
The Secretary went on to say that it is precisely for the reason that we want to hear how and where we can help more with the resources at our disposal that he desires to have frank discussions with Arab leaders like Al-Jamali; that he wants to consult with them and personally ascertain their thinking for the purpose of helping in the development of a more practicable and closer relationship between the United States and the Arab area.
This evidently pleased Al-Jamali and he expressed the hope that the present discussion between them might lead to further constructive exchanges of views during Al-Jamali's stay in the United States.
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