Dear Mr. President:
After the first ten days of this session of the General Assembly, I think it is fair to report that things are moving for us perhaps better than we might have expected. This is, as you know, a tough session for us, because we are caught in the middle on most of the colonial issues, but we have done our best to make a virtue out of our predicament.
The organizational phase of this session has gone off more quietly and smoothly than usual. Partly, this reflects a gingery feeling about our elections. And partly, this may be because the Russians have so far been operating under wraps. They have gone through a restrained rehash of their charges from previous years, but they have acted either with hesitancy or restraint. They have clearly not yet shown their full hand.
As we anticipated from our analysis of the Communist Party Congress in Moscow and related actions, the Russians are doing their best to isolate us from our allies, and to play upon all the differences in the non-Communist world. We have been interested to see how they would meet the dilemma of trying to woo the British and French away from us, and at the same time appeal to the people of the colonial areas. It looks as if they have decided to stress the latter, and let the former go for another time. They have lumped the British and French together with us as the Atlantic warmongers, and have made strenuous appeals, both on the floor, and in the lobbies, to the Arab-Asian bloc.
- 2 -
It appears to me that the outstanding political fact of the Assembly thus far has been the domination of the proceedings by the Asian-African group, which has been successful in every major effort up to this point. The Asian-African bloc has been exceptionally skillful in allying themselves with both Latin American and Soviets on particular issues, obtaining majorities which could not be countered by votes of Western European and Commonwealth members. The solidity of this Asian-African bloc, which is based on high-keyed nationalist and racial issues, is going to give us much more difficulty this year than ever before.
As a consequence, the mood of the British, French and other Western European delegations is bitter and resigned. These delegations are determined to fight against attacks on their colonial policies, but it is a retreating, holding operation in which their prospects for success are small. If the Asian-African bloc pushes the GA too hard, the reaction of the Western European and Commonwealth states may be violent. In the case of South Africa, whose race policies are for the first time under direct attack, there is serious danger that the Delegation may actually withdraw from active participation in the Organization. If this should initiate a general trend on the part of the French and other colonial powers, the result may be the most serious internal threat the UN has yet had to face.
For awhile, the French had their backs up over an affirmative vote by us that the Political Committee take up the Tunis and Morocco items immediately following the debate on Korea. This vote
- 3 -
was cast in a situation in which, according to our estimate, the outcome would have been the same however we voted. By so voting, we were able to pick up a little leverage with the Asian-African group which may enable us to moderate the debate when the items are discussed. We have talked to the French both here and in Paris, and I think their initial sharp reaction is subsiding. They are faced with such an unstable and inflamed political situation at home that they are having a very difficult time here, and are difficult for us to deal with as a consequence. However, they have joined with us in sponsoring the resolution on Korea, thus indicating that we do not have a serious division on our hands, at least so far.
The Political Committee began its work on the Korean item Thursday. During the first day of debate, we had a majority against issuing an invitation to the North Koreans but the voting indicated that many of our Asian friends were still inclined to sit on the fence. Therefore, in my opening statement yesterday, I felt it necessary to lay it on the line pretty heavily, to show who started this business, and to remind the members how earnestly we have tried to restore peace in Korea, without any cooperation from the Communists. Reactions afterward indicated that we picked up considerable support as a result of this approach. We have introduced a resolution which would vote confidence in the way the United States has conducted the negotiations in Korea, and explicitly in our position on prisoners of war; the resolution would also call on the Communists to agree to an armistice on a basis consistent with the principle of non-forceable repatriation.
- 4 -
Twenty other governments have joined with us in sponsoring this resolution. This includes virtually all the governments with troops in Korea. I believe we stand a good chance of presenting a good firm majority on Korea, which may have an effect on the Communist expectations.
By putting heavy stress on the Soviet responsibility for the Korean affair in my presentation yesterday, I feel that we may have helped to increase the liability to the Russians of a continuation of the Korean episode, and particularly to make them feel the contradiction between this running sore in Asia and their pretensions of peace. I hope this speech will have met at least some of the requirements of the speech you spoke to David Bruce about having me do here.
I felt it necessary to dispel the impression Vishinski was trying to create, that the Communists had really offered some new concession in their note to General Harrison of October 8th. So far, there has been no indication that the Russians are ready to make any genuine move on Korea, but we are watching the situation closely.
In summing up the situation here, it appears to me that our principal job is to hold our friends and allies together in the face of a determined Soviet effort to drive wedges between us. Although we are still in the very early stages of this session, I think it looks reasonably promising so far. By starting out with a tone of moderation and letting the Soviets hang themselves with their own invective, we have picked up support from some of our friends with neutralist tendencies.
I have been endeavoring to do as much in the way of informal contacts here as possible, particularly with Latin American and Middle Eastern
- 5 -
representatives. This kind of personal spade work is extremely useful, not only here, but in terms of our work on many other problems.
According to present indications, the Soviet reply to my statement in the Political Committee on Korea may come early next week. Because of the importance of the Korean issue, I believe I should remain here at least through the first rebuttal to Vishinsky's presentation, and then take a new reading on how much longer it would be useful for me to remain.
With best regards, Dean Acheson
October 25, 1952 October 25, 1952
MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
My dear Mr. President:
After the first ten days of this session of the General Assembly, I think it is fair to report that things are moving for us perhaps better than we might have expected. This is, as you know, a tough session for us, because we are caught in the middle on most of the colonial issues, but we have done our best to make a virtue out of our predicament.
The organizational phase of this session has gone off more quietly and smoothly than usual. Partly, this reflects a gingery feeling about our elections. And partly, this may be because the Russians have so far been operating under wraps. They have gone through a restrained rehash of their charges from previous years, but they have acted either with hesitancy or restraint. They have clearly not yet shown their full hand.
As we anticipated from our analysis of the Communist Party Congress in Moscow and related actions, the Russians are doing their best to isolate us from our allies, and to play upon all the differences in the non-Communist world. We have been interested to see how they would meet the dilemma of trying to woo the British and French away from us, and at the same time appeal to the people of the colonial areas. It looks as if they have decided to stress the latter, and let the former go for another time. They have lumped the British and French together with us as the Atlantic warmongers, and have made strenuous appeals, both on the floor, and in the lobbies, to the Arab-Asian bloc.
It appears to me that the outstanding political fact of the Assembly thus far has been the domination of the proceedings by the Arab-Asian group, which has been successful in every major effort up to this point. The Arab- Asian bloc has been exceptionally skillful in allying themselves with both Latin American and Soviets on particular issues, obtaining majorities which could not be countered by votes of Western European and Commonwealth members. The solidity of this Arab-Asian bloc, which is based on high- keyed nationalist and racial issues, is going to give us much more difficulty this year than ever before.
- 2 -
As a consequence, the mood of the British, French and other Western European delegations is bitter. These delegations are determined to fight against attacks on their colonial policies, but it is a retreating, holding operation in which their prospects for success are small. If the Arab- Asian bloc pushes the GA too hard, the reaction of the Western European and Commonwealth states may be violent. In the case of South Africa, whose segregation policies are for the first time under direct attack, there is serious danger that the Delegation may actually withdraw from active participation in the Organization. If this should initiate a general trend on the part of the French and other colonial powers, the result may be the most serious internal threat the UN has yet had to face.
For awhile, the French had their backs up over an affirmative vote by us that the Political Committee take up the Tunis and Morocco items immediately following the debate on Korea. This vote was cast in a situation in which, according to our estimate, the outcome would have been the same however we voted. By so voting, we were able to pick up a little leverage with the Arab-Asian group which may enable us to moderate the debate when the items are discussed. We have talked to the French both here and in Paris, and while their reaction is still acute, I think their initial sharp reaction is subsiding. They are faced with such an unstable and inflamed political situation at home that they are having a very difficult time here, and are difficult for us to deal with as a consequence. However, they have joined with us in sponsoring the resolution on Korea, thus indicating that we do not have a serious division on our hands, at least so far.
The Political Committee began its work on the Korean item Thursday. During the first day of debate, we had a majority against issuing an invitation to the North Koreans but the voting indicated that many of our Asian friends were still inclined to sit on the fence. Therefore, in my opening statement yesterday, I felt it necessary to lay it on the line pretty heavily, to show who started this business, and to remind the members how earnestly we have tried to restore peace in Korea, without any cooperation from the Communists. Reactions afterward indicated that we picked up considerable support as a result of this approach. We have introduced a resolution which would vote confidence in the way the United States has conducted the negotiations in Korea, and explicitly in our position on prisoners of war; the resolution would also call on the Communists to agree to an armistice on a basis consistent with the principle of non-forceable repatriation. Twenty other governments have joined with us in sponsoring this resolution. This includes virtually all the governments with troops in Korea. I believe we stand a good chance of presenting a good firm majority on Korea, which may have an effect on the Communist expectations.
- 3 -
By putting heavy stress on the Soviet responsibility for the Korean affair in my presentation yesterday, I feel that we may have helped to increase the liability to the Russians of a continuation of the Korean episode, and particularly to make them feel the contradiction between this running sore in Asia and their pretensions of peace. I hope this speech will have met at least some of the requirements of the speech you spoke to David Bruce about having me do here.
I felt it necessary to dispel the impression Vishinski was trying to create, that the Communists had really offered some new concession in their note to General Harrison of October 8th. So far, there has been no indication that the Russians are ready to make any genuine move on Korea, but we are watching the situation closely.
In summing up the situation here, it appears to me that our principal job is to hold our friends and allies together in the face of a determined Soviet effort to drive wedges between us. Although we are still in the very early stages of this session, I think it looks reasonably promising so far. By starting out with a tone of moderation and letting the Soviets hang themselves with their own invective, we have picked up support from some of our friends with neutralist tendencies.
I have been endeavoring to do as much in the way of informal contacts here as possible, particularly with Latin American and Middle Eastern representatives. This kind of personal spade work is extremely useful, not only here, but in terms of our work on many other problems.
According to present indications, the Soviet reply to my statement in the Political Committee on Korea may come early next week. Because of the importance of the Korean issue, I believe I should remain here at least through the first rebuttal to Vishinsky's presentation, and then take a new reading on how much longer it would be useful for me to remain.
Most respectfully,
Dean Acheson
Attachment: USUN Press Release 1566