UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
October 29, 1952 (Typed October 30, 1952)
SUBJECT: Korea and Tunisia
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Nasrollah Entezam The Secretary Mr. Plitt
Ambassador Entezam called on the Secretary at 11:30 a.m. today in response to the latter's invitation. The Secretary thanked him for coming and explained that he thought that an exchange of views on Korea and Tunisia might be useful, especially as he greatly valued Ambassador Entezam's opinions on United Nations matters in connection with which the latter had such extensive experience. The Secretary took the opportunity to praise the Ambassador's masterful presiding over the Fifth General Assembly and that perhaps his unusual influence among the Arab-Asian group could be very useful in connection with the Korean and Tunisian questions.
1. Korea. In regard to Korea, Ambassador Entezam replied that the Secretary had covered the subject so completely in his statement and had explained a number of things so well, some of which had not been sufficiently clarified before, and had spoken of others of which the Ambassador had had no previous knowledge, that he and other Committee 1 members had been deeply impressed and were now in a better position to assess the Korean situation as described by the Secretary.
In regard to the resolution submitted by the United States Delegation, Ambassador Entezam thought that it was both logical and moderate and implied that he was inclined to vote for it. This seemed emphasized with his remark that he would not ask for instructions from his foreign office [presumably on this subject]. He was not optimistic, however, in regard to the attitude of the other members of the Arab-Asian group. Some of them wanted first to hear Mr. Vyshinsky, and then take a careful look at any proposal he might make in the course of his statement which is scheduled
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for today. Ambassador Entezam expressed the opinion that a USSR resolution could be expected to receive some support from delegation members and perhaps considerable support from the Arab-Asian group.
Expanding this thought somewhat further he suggested that it might be tactically advisable to support the putting of a Russian resolution to a vote-and ahead of the United States resolution. A Russian resolution in his opinion stood a good chance to be voted down and if the American resolution were then to be voted on, it would not only pass but in all likelihood gather some of the votes previously cast for the Russian resolution. In the meantime Ambassador Entezam said that he would do what he could to develop a favorable climat among his colleagues for the resolution offered by the Secretary.
There was a further discussion on the general aspect of the Korean problem and then the Secretary referred to Tunisia.
2. Tunisia. On this subject the Secretary explained to Ambassador Entezam our attitude toward this problem in general terms and solicited the Ambassador's help in counseling moderation and constructive discussion of the subject by speakers of the Arab-Asian group. He compared what might be gained and what, in all likelihood, might be lost if the debate degenerated into bitter accusations and denunciations. He emphasized also the advisability of refraining from requesting that Tunisian and Moroccan representatives be heard during the debate because the sponsors of the items were in his opinion sufficiently well informed through their exhaustive studies of these issues so that any further airing by non- members of the UN of the Tunisian and Moroccan complaints would not serve any useful purpose and could even prove harmful to the reaching of an agreement on the settlement of the controversy. Ambassador Entezam agreed.
The Secretary then set forth the efforts he himself was making with respect to the French to enlist their help toward a wholesome consideration of the North African problems during the discussions, and expressed the hope that he would like to count on the prestige and influence of the Ambassador to do the same with his colleagues in the Arab-Asian group. While conceding the advisability of such an approach, the Ambassador nevertheless expressed concern that it might prove difficult to restrain some of the Arab delegates who felt very strongly that Tunisia and Morocco would no longer be satisfied with substanceless promises from the French and who could be expected to insist on a strong resolution, the establishment of investigating groups or bodies, and other measures to which France would certainly refuse to agree. Nonetheless, he was ready to do what he could to endeavor to convince the Arabs of the wisdom of steering the issue into objective and constructive debates.
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The Ambassador then took leave after assuring the Secretary that he would be willing to use "what little influence I have" and keep the secretary informed of any progress made in his mediatory efforts with the Arab-Asian group to approach this subject in a reasonable and politically realistic manner.
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In accompanying the Ambassador to the door he was asked whether he had attended the Vyshinsky dinner. He replied in the affirmative and added that when someone asked Mr. Vyshinsky whether he expected to speak in Committee 1 today, he said, "Yes," and added jokingly that his statement would, however, be a long one because Mr. Acheson had taken nearly three hours, and that he would be obliged to speak at least that long, and then take at least another hour to answer some of Mr. Acheson's questions.
Distribution: Basic List
EAPlitt: un