October 30, 1952
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Acheson Sir Zafrulla Khan
Sir Zafrulla Khan called upon me by appointment this morning and said that he wished to mention three subjects.
1. Vishinsky's Speech. As to this, he thought that the whole first part of the speech lasting over two hours was surely a reply to my review of the Korean situation which Vishinsky felt that he had to go through with. It had nothing new and was not impressive.
As to the part of the speech on prisoners of war, he said that this had been discussed at a Commonwealth meeting this morning and that the view which he had expressed there he would express to me. It was that Vishinsky had dodged the issue, which was whether prisoners who would forcibly resist repatriation should be forcibly repatriated. He dodged this by stating that the problem did not exist because it was the UNC which was using force in an attempt to prevent the prisoners from exercising their right to repatriation. As he saw the situation, an attempt should be made to force Vishinsky to deal with the real questions and state whether on the assumption that the problem did exist, his attitude was or was not that force must be used.
As he analyzed the legal situation, no one questioned that the prisoners had the right to be repatriated if they wished to be. In the past the question hardly, if ever, arose as to whether the prisoners wished to return, and most of them did. Only a political refugee would not wish to exercise his right. Now, due to the violent ideological differences, the question did arise. He saw nothing in any of the treaties or in international law to justify the conclusion that the prisoners had to be forced, if necessary, to go home even though both the prisoners and the detaining state were willing to let them stay.
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At the Commonwealth meeting Menon, the Indian Representative, had asked why the issue had to be clarified. Why not, he had asked, agree on the right of repatriation and allow some neutral group to administer it after an armistice. Sir Zafrulla and others had pointed out that this would only open the door to charges of bad faith and a breach of the armistice. He thought this was no solution.
He then said he thought that Vishinsky's resolution jumped the whole stage of the armistice and was really talking about what should be done after the armistice. He did not see how this commission could solve the prisoner problem, and he did not believe Vishinsky expected it to. He thought that there might be some allure in this resolution, since a lot of people might believe that in some vague way it offered a solution. He asked me to consider whether the resolution properly amended might merely confirm the recommendation of the commanders that after an armistice there should be a political meeting. He did not put this forward as something he advocated, but merely as something that should be studied. I said that, of course, I should give any suggestion of his the most careful thought.
2. Tunis and Morocco. He said that he was quite willing himself, and to urge his friends to do the same, to conduct the discussion upon the assumption that they were not questioning French motives, and that the French Constitution and other declarations of the Government led to the conclusion that all were agreed upon the ultimate objective. The only question was method and tempo. This required some cooperation from the French. He had told the Tunisians and Moroccans that they were quite wrong in expecting some miracle from the UN. All that the UN could do was to create a better atmosphere for discussions between the French and the Protectorates. It was up to the Tunisians and Moroccans to conduct their side of the negotiations wisely. He realized that our intentions were good and that our difficulties were great. He asked whether at some stage it might be possible for me to tell him whether or not some cooperation could be expected from the French.
I replied that I had hoped to be able to talk with him further at a later stage, but that I could really have very little information until I had had a talk
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with Mr. Schuman. My great hope was that we could avoid pitching a discussion at the outset at the least upon issues which would only inflame the debaters. I hoped that the French would be willing to reserve their position on competence and would discuss the issues first. I hoped that the Arab-Asian group would not precipitate a debate on invitations to be issued to Tunisians or Moroccans who could add nothing to the discussion and whose suggested presence would start the French off in a very bad state of mind. I would hope that the French would lay out what they had done and would propose to discuss difficulties in the ways of meeting them and that we could have a moderate and restrained discussion as to whether under the circumstances we could have greater speed.
Sir Zafrulla said he was glad I had mentioned the question of invitations to North Africans, because, although he had not attended any meetings of the group, he had heard a report that there might be a motion to invite the Bey of Tunis to designate representatives. I said that in my judgment this would be most unwise. He said he would attempt to keep the group from committing itself on this or any other procedural matter at least until we were able to let him know whether or not the French would proceed with the discussion on the merits.
3. He then mentioned Kashmir. I asked whether it would not be wise to ask Ambassador Gross to join us. He said that this was not necessary because he was going to see Mr. Gross and would go over the one matter which he wished to mention to me, as well as a great many more detailed matters.
What he wished to mention to me was the necessity for some progress. He felt that the situation in Pakistan was deteriorating. Although the Government was determined that it would not go to war over this question, he wished to assure me that the Government did not have the same control over the people as it did a year ago and that it would have less power of control six months or a year from now. Therefore, he urged that we regard this as a pressing matter and that we do everything in our power to have some progress made.