UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
October 31, 1952 (Typed November 1, 1952)
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Korea, EDC, Tunisia and Morocco
PARTICIPANTS: Foreign Minister Luns, Netherlands Delegation
The Secretary of State Homer M. Byington, Jr.
COPIES TO: U.S. Delegation, 7th GA Department Mr. Taylor Distribution to be Mr. Popper determined by S/S Mr. Ross Secretary-General Reference
Mr. Luns said that he had a number of matters which he wished to take up with the Secretary.
Korea.
First, with regard to Korea, he wished to reaffirm that in event of agreement on an armistice the Netherlands will carry through its commitment to join in the warning previously discussed.
In the event of no armistice, which now seemed probable in the light of the Soviet intransigence concerning the prisoner of war question, the Netherlands Government was disposed to join in certain steps in the political and economic fields. Two years ago the Netherlands Government had sent a Charge d'Affaires to Peiping, thereby recognizing the Chinese People's Government. The Chinese authorities, however, apparently regarded this emissary as sent to make arrangements for the resumption of diplomatic relations. On their part they had indicated an intention to establish relations, principally by requesting a building in the Hague which had been set aside for them. Mr. Luns said he had recently taken opportunity to reallocate this building to the Netherlands Government and was glad to have taken this step towards cutting off the proposed establishment of a Chinese Mission in the Hague. Should the armistice negotiations not succeed, he would be prepared seriously to consider the withdrawal from Peiping of the Dutch Charge d'Affaires and felt that the Netherlands could make a very good case for so doing. While it would not constitute non-recognition of the People's Republic of China, it would in actual practice be a complete cutting off of relations between two countries.
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In the economic field, he had given this matter some thought already, and before leaving the Hague had instructed his colleagues to prepare an Order in Council which would prohibit Dutch ships from visiting Chinese ports with the exception, of course, of Hong Kong and Macao. He felt he could assure the Secretary that his Government would be disposed to cooperate in an undertaking of this nature. It might be of some assistance in preventing shipments from Indonesia and other ports such as Colombo, Ceylon, as well as preventing the charter of vessels by shippers exporting to Communist China.
In the military field, he would expect that we would probably wish to step up our military activity as an additional form of pressure in order to obtain an armistice. He was thoroughly in agreement that this should be done but wish to bring particularly to the Secretary's attention the matter of the possible increase of air activity on both sides, which might well lead to the military desirability of bombing air installations beyond the Yalu River. This would bring about the prospect of considerably enlarging the present theatre of hostilities and the Dutch Government earnestly requested that it should be consulted in advance before any such military decision was taken.
The Secretary expressed keen interest in what the Foreign Minister had told him. He said that during these many months of negotiations we had found considerable evidence to substantiate an opinion that the Soviet and Chinese Communists had in fact really desired an armistice. They were, however, out to make the maximum demands that they could in obtaining it. The issue now seemed to be hanging in the balance and every form of pressure that we could administer was of the greatest importance. While the withdrawal of the Dutch representative in Peiping would probably not influence the Chinese Communists very greatly, since it seemed clear they did not want foreign representatives in China, nevertheless it would be extremely useful in showing unity on the part of the West. The economic measure mentioned by Mr. Luns could be of considerable help. In studying the Chinese economic situation, we had become convinced that reduction or stoppage of shipments into China in fact created real pressure on them. The cutting down of shipments by sea into China had to be compensated for by increased rail shipments over the Trans-Siberia Railroad. This in turn meant reduction in the amount of supplies already being received by rail. There was no doubt but that the Chinese were in great need of pharmaceuticals both for the civilian population and their troops, as well as rubber and other raw materials. He would welcome the Order in Council regarding Dutch ships which Mr. Luns has suggested.
With regard to the military situation, the Secretary said he could not give the Foreign Minister new information at this time because the matter was still under study by the military authorities. It seemed that the resumption of an offensive at this point would require very heavy loss of life before the UN troops could be in a tactical situation of mobility. This would be a decision that probably would have to rest, not with the outgoing administration, but with the new government about to be elected. This question of bombing air installations beyond the Yalu involved two considerations. First, the military considered secrecy of the upmost importance in assuring the success of such an operation, and were opposed on those grounds to prior consultation with other governments. On the other hand, from a political point of view, it
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was fully recognized that prior consultation with the other governments was of great importance. The Secretary could not at this time predict which view would prevail in the event that this action should have to be taken.
EDC.
The Foreign Minister informed the Secretary that the Netherlands Government intended to go ahead with ratification of the EDC even though it realized it might be alone with Germany in taking this step. He knew that the Belgians and probably the others would not act until after the French had ratified, and French ratification seemed to be fraught with difficulties and out of the question until next spring. He sympathized with the French and mentioned the terrible problem posed to France in having to choose between reconstitution of Germany armed might on the one hand, and the danger of Soviet aggression on the other. The problem for the Netherlands was not quite as difficult because they realized that there was no possibility of any defense of their frontiers unless German military support was assured.
The Secretary expressed his gratification that the Netherlands Government intends to press for ratification and said that it would have an important influence in Western Europe if the Dutch should ratify the EDC without waiting for action on the part of the French and other nations.
Tunisia and Morocco.
Mr. Luns then raised the question of consideration by the UN of Tunisia and Morocco. He said it was of the greatest importance that the French should receive our support. He urged that we use our influence every way that we could in persuading the Arab-Asian nations from pushing this issue in an uncompromising manner. North Africa had become so important to public opinion within France that neither this French Government nor any other could make concessions. Should we fail France at this time it might have very serious consequences. The Secretary outlined to Mr. Luns the conversations he had had recently with Sir Zafrulla Khan, Madame Pandit, Ambassador Palar, Dr. Al-Jamali, and other leaders of the Arab-Asian group, in which he had urged upon them the great importance of moderation. He had emphasized that if these leaders wished the UN to have any possibility of being helpful in the matter they must not insist on controversial questions such as representation in the Committee for Tunis and Morocco. The Secretary noted the reasonable attitude he had found in Sir Zafrulla Khan, and Mr. Luns agreed that there may be some hope from him. He, himself, would work with the Indonesians, with whom the Dutch had some influence when it did not concern Netherlands' interests. The Secretary then gave Mr. Luns a complete resumé
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of U.S. policy regarding Tunisia and Morocco. He recounted in detail his meeting with Schuman and other French Cabinet members last May in Paris and he went over, point by point, his letter to M. Schuman which is being delivered today. He would not know, he presumed, what the French reaction would be until Mr. Schuman had arrived here. He was convinced, however, that if the French would come forward with a vigorous and constructive statement of their political and economic accomplishments in Tunisia and Morocco and their plans for the future, we would be able to support them and succeed in averting the disastrous situation which Mr. Luns, with good reason, had envisaged. He felt it most important in talking with France that her friends should urge such a course of action. Mr. Luns expressed full agreement that this seemed to be the only possible way to meet the problem and that the Secretary's view with regard to discussing the substance of the matter, rather than the right of discussing it, was the best way to meet the issue. He said he was most grateful for and impressed by this full statement of the U.S. policy.
(Western New Guinea. A separate memorandum is being prepared with reference to Mr. Lun's remark concerning Western New Guinea).
HMByington, Jr.:bw