DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: November 3, 1952
SUBJECT: Trieste and the Forthcoming Exploratory Military Talks in Belgrade
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Mr. Ridgway B. Knight, WE His Excellency Randolfo Pacciardi, Italian Minister of National Defense Ambassador Tarchiani, Italian Embassy
COPIES TO: S Embassy, Rome EUR (2) London EE (1) Paris WE (2) Belgrade RA (1) USPOLAD, FTT USUN, Mr. Byington Defense
Mr. Pacciardi gave me a letter from Prime Minister de Gasperi stressing the essential importance of a reasonable solution of the Trieste question before there can be question of military and political cooperation on the part of any Italian Government with Yugoslavia (the text of this letter is attached).
Mr. Pacciardi declared that while he had not come to Washington to solve the Trieste question, he had come to do his best in order to avoid a further complication of the solution of this question. Mr. de Gasperi had been deeply impressed by the fact that the United States, British and French Ambassadors had been instructed to call on the Italian Government to inform it of the forthcoming military talks in Belgrade. This was taken by the Italians as an indication of the importance which we placed on these talks and increased their concern accordingly. Mr. Pacciardi repeated the well-known Italian line that the more Yugoslavia is integrated with the West in all fields, regardless of what happens in Trieste, the worse becomes Italy's bargaining position. On several occasions Mr. Pacciardi made it clear that regardless of what we have said to date, the Italians expect some kind of an agreement to come out of the Belgrade military talks. On several occasions and in different words, Mr. Pacciardi asked why, if the military situation did not require it, it was necessary for us to proceed with these military talks with Yugoslavia at this precise time in view of the critical situation facing the Italian Government at home and which might become a real government crisis if the Belgrade conversations became known as would presumably be the case. He stressed the full cooperation which the Italian
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Government has given to the United States and to the NATO. He said that without an equitable solution of the Trieste problem it might be doubtful whether the present governmental majority would be able to return to power in next spring's elections, and that such a victory is required as the present government's work is not completed and as several years more are required to consolidate Italy's present democratic institutions. He insisted on several occasions that his purpose in coming to Washington was to obtain a postponement "in terms of a few weeks" of the Belgrade talks.
Referring more particularly to the Trieste question, Mr. Pacciardi made it clear that the Italian Government was looking to the United States rather than to the three powers to propose a solution. He expressed confidence that a solution proposed by the United States would be equitable and made it clear that it was the United States and not the UK and France which had influence and prestige both in Yugoslavia and in Italy. In other words, he repeated and supported the suggestion which was made on October 16 to Mr. Bruce by Ambassador Tarchiani.
Addressing myself to the two major topics covered in Mr. Pacciardi's presentation, I started by stating my conviction that Mr. de Gasperi had a wrong impression of General Handy's forthcoming visit to Belgrade and of the talks in which he would participate on behalf of the United States, the UK and France. I explained that for a long time we had been desirous of ascertaining what were Tito's dispositions in case of an attack. Would he attempt to defend all of Yugoslavia, or instead would he adopt a more limited military position fitting in better with the general plans for the defense of Europe. General Collins, Messrs. Nash and Pace have gone to Belgrade but this information has not been elicitated. Now that Tito has agreed to these talks with a US army officer, we think that it is in the interest of all the Western powers to carry through with this plan while Tito is willing. I made it clear that the US had not wanted to do so without the knowledge of the Italian Government. I pointed out that General Handy was not a SHAPE official, was in charge of the US service and supplies in Europe, and did not represent anyone or any party seeking an agreement with the Yugoslavs in these talks. I expressed the opinion that there should be no problem resulting from General Handy's trip to Belgrade unless speculation is stirred up, and in this connection expressed my concern over several of the press reports which are contained in Rome's telegram 2001. The US has supplied military equipment to Yugoslavia over a course of time and the three powers have supplied economic aid. It is therefore quite normal and natural that we should now seek to find out how this aid is being use. I expressed the strong belief that if handled in such a routine manner, General
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Handy's visit to Belgrade should cause no more unfortunate rumors than had the earlier visits of General Collins and of Messrs. Nash and Pace.
Turning to the question of Trieste, I reminded my callers that the US had consistently displayed a more vigorous attitude than any other country with Tito. I said that we have lost no occasion to point out to the Yugoslavs that no real basis for cooperation can exist until the Trieste question is solved and that there would be no substance to any plans with Yugoslavia until Trieste had been settled. While making it quite clear that we did not and would not link a Trieste settlement to the exploratory military conversations, I expressed my sincere belief that these conversations could only serve to highlight to Marshal Tito the importance of a Trieste solution in view of the requirement for Italian cooperation. I mentioned that such things as Trieste as an obvious logistic base and the need for air cover would constitute military facts which should speak for themselves.
I then said that while originally I had strongly hoped that the Italians and the Yugoslavs could solve the Trieste question in bilateral negotiations, I now realized that this was impossible. Therefore we received Ambassador Tarchiani's suggestion of a US proposed solution with the greatest interest. This proposal is now receiving urgent and thorough consideration in the Department and we will come up with some such proposal if we conclude that this suggested procedure is a good one. I made it quite clear, however, that I did not see why such a course of action on Trieste should be connected with General Handy's trip to Belgrade. On the contrary I thought that for the reasons stated above, that this trip might help as we should be able to find a way to make quite clear to Tito that we consider Trieste one of the most dangerous unsolved problems in Western Europe.
Mr. Pacciardi expressed his deep appreciation for this thorough presentation which clearly indicated that the reasons for General Handy's trip to Belgrade were in no way hostile to Italy. He now saw how the results of this trip might be of help in connection with the overall defense of Europe. He commented that had the Italian Government been informed as fully along the same lines initially their concern would have been considerably less, and he again referred to the real emotion which had been caused by the mere fact that the three powers had seen fit to instruct their Ambassadors to inform the Italian Government of the impending talks. I said that there must have been some misunderstanding on the part of my Italian friends in view of the instructions which had been sent to our Ambassador in Rome, and in view of his report of the exact language which he had used in informing Mr. Zoppi. Mr. Pacciardi admitted that probably
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Mr. Zoppi had not been able fully to note all the points which were made and said that in any event he thought it would be useful if Ambassador Bunker could make again the same points which had now been covered by me and which should contribute to easing Mr. de Gasperi's mind.
With reference to the object of his mission, i.e., obtaining a short postponement of the Belgrade talks, Mr. Pacciardi said that both Mr. Lovett and General Bradley had agreed to reconsider the problem and while reserving their decision stated that they saw no reason why a brief postponement might not be possible. I made it quite clear that I had not obtained the same impression from Mr. Lovett as I had understood that the latter had definitely said that he could not promise any appreciable postponement of these military conversations and advised Mr. Pacciardi to clear up any possible misunderstanding on this score with the Department of Defense.
Finally we briefly discussed the line which we should take with the press. It was decided that we would say that this was a courtesy call and that Mr. Pacciardi had availed himself of this opportunity of talking to Mr. Acheson about the general Italian political situation. With regard to the overall press line to be taken at the conclusion of Mr. Pacciardi's trip it was decided to adhere to the original line taken by the Italian Government in Rome to the effect that Mr. Paciardi had come to the United States in order to discuss a range of military problems and more particularly off-shore procurement.
Attachment.
EUR:WE:RBKnight:mt