FOREIGN OFFICE
Paris, Tokyo and Saving to Washington
Following from Secretary of State.
U. K. Delegation telegram No. 759 (November 9th: Korea).
Minister of State, Sir G. Jebb and I had meeting this morning at which Mr. Acheson, Mr. Gross, M. Schuman, M. Hoppenot (Permanent French Delegate to the United Nations), Mr. Pearson, Sir P. Spender and Mr. Webb were present, to discuss next steps in the General Assembly on Korea.
2. I referred to various tentative drafts of an Indian resolution which had been circulated unofficially. None of these in my view met the essential requirements that principle of non-forcible repatriation must be clearly stated. Moreover we could not endorse any resolution entailing risk of deadlock after signature of armistice agreement; in that situation we should have lost means of pressure represented by our air superiority and we should still have failed to secure return of our own prisoners of war. This was a situation which we had always been determined to avoid.
3. Mr. Acheson said that he could not accept any resolution which made no provision for disposal of Communist prisoners of war refusing repatriation or which in other ways might allow undue pressure to be brought to bear upon such prisoners. Mr. Acheson said that he had spoken on these lines to Mr. Krishna Menon.
4. Mr. Pearson said he had some sympathy with Mr. Krishna Menon's efforts. Mr. Pearson started from the assumption that it was most important to get an armistice if we could, and also that it would be to our advantage to get the Indians to put forward a resolution which recognised the principle of non-forcible repatriation and which we could accept even if the Chinese turned it down. He personally was
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not so worried about the position of the remnant of prisoners of war refusing repatriation; it must be compared with the position of these and all other prisoners of war if we got no armistice at all. Mr. Menon saw difficulty in accepting a clear statement against forcible repatriation, since he thought the Chinese would never swallow this. Mr. Pearson felt that it would be worth trying to meet the Indian view if we could.
5. Mr. Acheson said that at any time within the past six months we could have solved the repatriation problem either by agreeing to repatriate all prisoners of war, or by agreeing to an armistice and leaving the question of prisoners of war over for later discussion. Mr. Menon's plan seemed to be nothing but a mixture of these two ideas. Mr. Vyshinsky's uncompromising speech must be met by a equally firm stand on our part.
6. Sir Percy Spender said that he personally agreed with Mr. Acheson. He thought that a clear resolution should be put before the Assembly and that this could best be achieved by amending the existing resolution sponsored by 21 powers (including the U.K. and U.S.) to bring it more into line with the Indian-Asian point of view. We must avoid anything which looked like a retreat in the face of Communist pressure.
7. Mr. Pearson said that he did not interpret the type of resolution proposed by the Indians as such a retreat.
8. Mr. Webb agreed with Mr. Pearson.
9. Mr. Pearson added that he would find great difficulty in voting against the Indian draft if it was tabled.
10. M. Schuman suggested that we should work for a fusion of the 21 power resolution and the Indian draft.
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11. I suggested that if Mr. Menon met us on the main points to which we attached importance (see paras. 2 and 3 above) a resolution on the lines of his draft would have very wide popular support. If the Communists turned it down we should be in a very strong position with public opinion.
12. Conclusion of meeting was that we should continue to work on Mr. Menon with a view to his tabling a resolution acceptable to us, and that we should review the situation as soon as we knew what he had decided to do.