UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
November 12, 1952 The Waldorf New York, N. Y.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: European Items raised by Mr. Eden in New York
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr. Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Mr. Eden
The Secretary of State Mr. Perkins Mr. Jessup Mr. Byington
COPIES TO: Mr. Byington Mr. Allen Mr. Jessup Department of State: Distribution to be determined by S/S
EDC. Mr. Eden referred to the increasingly difficult situation with regard to Franco-German relations. He mentioned his conversations with both Pleven and Schuman at the time of the denunciation of the EDC by Herriot and Daladier and said that the situation with regard to French ratification was precarious. He said that recently Pleven had informed him that the problem of French ratification of the EDC was so great that he had again to urge UK participation. Mr. Eden had done his best to discourage any such idea. He said that this was out of the question for the British Government even under some partial form of participation, as for instance contributing a number of divisions, or, as had once been suggested, the participation of British officers. He had pointed to the enormous loss of time, if the whole subject had to be reopened and re-discussed, and mentioned the alternative the Germans might put forth of German participation in the NATO. Mr. Eden was very concerned over the present drift of the French attitude. They seemed to be weakening in their determination regarding the EDC to such an extent that Pleven had lamented that EDC would leave them alone with the Germans. He (Mr. Eden) had replied that there were 50 million French as well as 50 million Germans; moreover, there were other countries participating in EDC.
The Secretary referred to his recent conversation with M. Bech and M. Van Zeeland and the similar preoccupations of both of these Foreign Ministers. M. Bech had stressed that the whole situation hung on the single thread of two
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lives - Mr. Schuman and Mr. Adenaur - the former was likely to be thrown out of office at any time after the budget had come up for consideration, and the latter was very old, infirm and facing a national election next year. Mr. Van Zeeland had likewise outlined the difficulties brought about by the rapid resurgence of Germany, but could offer no solution. The Secretary had said to both we would welcome any suggestions they might have.
Mr. Eden mentioned the doubts of the Europeans regarding Italy and their fear of Mr. de Gasperi's losing his grip in the face of growing neo- fascism.
Mr. Perkins said that he did not believe there was much the U.S. should do now with regard to putting on pressure for hastening parliamentary consideration of EDC. He said that we had done about as much as we could and that additional representations now might make the situation worse rather than better because of the resentment such pressure would arouse. Mr. Eden recognized this and said he had wanted to help in every way that he could short of British participation in the organization itself. Aside from this, however, we should begin to think about what alternative plan we could fall back on in the event that it should become clear the French would be unable to ratify.
The Saar. Mr. Eden referred to his conversations with Mr. Schuman regarding the Saar. He expressed his regret that Adenaur and Schuman had failed to agree on a joint statement and blamed the French Parliament for its insistence on retention of the economic status quo in the face of Adenauer's very important concession from Germany - namely, acceptance now of the principle of Europeanization. Mr. Acheson referred to the joint U.S.-British proposal for Europeanization of the Saar worked out last July and suggested we might continue our bilateral conversations along those lines. He understood that the U.K. had some suggestions as to the wording. Mr. Eden thanked the Secretary for this suggestion which was one he had been asked to make. It was agreed that both Governments should consult further together.
NATO Meeting December 15. Mr. Eden said that Ismay was anxious that a NATO meeting should be held December 15 and that the British Government also desired a meeting at that time. He inquired concerning the American position. He had heard that we were opposed and wanted postponement. He said that there were several things that could be discussed. The U.K. had now put in its estimates which amounted to about 1,600,000,000 pounds, a very formidable figure -- twice their military expenditures in 1939. This should help consideration of the 1953 force goals. He said that the meeting could also consider the organizational question, review what had been done, and make recommendations.
The Secretary said that we had received a rather discouraging telegram this morning from Paris and that we were now considering our position concerning the date of December 15. He wanted to make it clear, as he had said to Foreign Minister Kraft yesterday, that so far as the U.S. change of administration is concerned we do not think that that need stand in the way of holding a meeting on December 15. We were concerned that the meeting should be a successful one and not inconclusive, such as had been the case in Ottawa and Rome. Mr. Perkins
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explained that the difficulty lay in obtaining necessary financial information from the various countries in order to lay the ground-work in time for a sound force plan for 1953. He said that there was considerable discouragement in Paris among the technicians working on this problem and that at the time they had sent their present report, they, of course, did not know what Mr. Eden had told us with regard to the British submission of figures. The Secretary described the tremendous budget problem facing our Government and the necessity for an adequate preparation at this time. The estimated figure has been reported at 85 billions and there were current reports that the Congress would attempt to cut it to 70 billions. The presentation for the appropriations incident to our participation in the NATO and Foreign Assistance Program in Europe would be greatly assisted if the necessary supporting data in justification can be assembled in the forthcoming months and include NATO agreement over force goals reached for 1953-54 at the December meeting. Mr. Eden was impressed by the Secretary's argument, the importance of which he had not previously fully realized, particularly as regards the matter of timing.
Returning to the question of holding a meeting, Mr. Eden said he was glad that the Secretary had spoken with Mr. Kraft and said he had also spoken with him. It was his hope that we could see our way clear to having the meeting on December 15. He mentioned his own personal position: that before leaving England he had insisted on a Cabinet meeting which took four hours to approve the British estimates. He had told the Cabinet that their approval of the British figures were urgently required because of the over- riding necessity for holding the NATO meeting on December 15. If it were now postponed he would be in the position of having cried "Wolf!" Mr. Eden inquired whether we proposed that the three Secretaries for State, Defense and Treasury would attend. Mr. Acheson replied that he and Secretary Lovett would be there but he was not certain with regard to Mr. Snyder. Mr. Eden expressed agreement that it would be quite practicable to hold the meeting without the Finance Ministers, in which case he and Alexander would go.
Trieste. The Secretary read to Mr. Eden the memorandum prepared in the Department concerning Trieste. He also discussed the map showing the proposed line. Copies of the memorandum and the map were given to Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden expressed keen interest, reacted not unfavorably, and said he would try to have an answer next week after consulting London. His first thought was that the Yugoslavs would return with their demand for a corridor between Capo d'Istria and Trieste. He agreed with the Secretary that this type of solution was not a desirable one. He mentioned that in his three-hour talk in Belgrade Tito had appeared to waiver but that the Slovenes around him were particularly intransigent on this subject and had prevailed. He had doubts now that the Slovenes would agree.
He then raised the question that in the agreed solution there should also be mention of a free port in Trieste. He knew the Italians were prepared to agree to this but felt it important that there should be a guarantee on this question for Yugoslavs. The Secretary agreed that the paper should be revised to include Mr. Eden's suggestion. It was pointed out that the Italians
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now have a free port there and no difficulty was foreseen in this regard.
Mr. Eden then discussed the important question of reassurance to the Yugoslavs that the proposed solution would be final and they would not be further exposed to Italian Irredentist demands. He recognized that the paper includes this in the proposed representations to Tito but felt it should also be included in the representations to de Gasperi. Mr. Shuckburgh also questioned our reason for the timing with regard to advising Mr. de Gasperi. Mr. Perkins explained that the Defense Department did not wish us to approach de Gasperi until after the military talks in Belgrade had been concluded because they feared a leak might have a prejudicial effect upon those talks. Since it was expected that the Belgrade conversation would come to a close very shortly this did not seem to be a serious obstacle. No decision was taken regarding consultation with the French at this time although it was agreed that they should be brought into the picture at the appropriate time.
Egypt. Mr. Eden said that the situation with regard to Egypt looked a little more hopeful as a result of recent conversations with Naguib. Furthermore, he had studied the question of the base in the Canal at some length. It appeared that Field Marshal Montgomery and also the Minister for Defense, Field Marshal Alexander, no longer felt that it was essential that a base needed to be maintained there. As we knew, the Prime Minister's view was that it would be acceptable for the base to be maintained by the international force comprising US, French, and other troops. He knew that we could not agree to this. Field Marshall Montgomery's present thought, however, was that the defense of the area could be based from Turkey. Moreover, a division could be based in Cyprus and in North Africa. He could not agree to a position whereby the U.K. was kicked out of Egypt, but if there could be an agreement the situation would be different.
The elections in the Sudan still represented a most serious problem. He did not see how they could work out the matter of elections. The nomadic tribes would have to come over long distances by camel to vote and when they arrived at the polling place their first question would be how does the Government want them to vote.
HMByington, Jr.:bw