[Hand written]
To Dept: Distribution by S/S-R For Bruce
Pearson telephoned Secretary tonight to congratulate him on Committee One speech. Pearson then set forth idea that ceasefire in Korea should be sought after UN Resolution tabled today by US has been committed to commies and is [?? perhaps __________ ] by them. Secretary said this would, he thought, be extremely difficult and mentioned, in particular, adverse effect on Air Force operations.
Secretary said he would, however, mention [ ??____________) and others and let Pearson know US reaction. Secretary wishes this be mentioned only on need-to-know basis. He believes idea is dangerous and impractical, but that US is obligated to give formal consideration and reply.
November 14, 1952
DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION of November 13, 1952
After his return from dinner with Foreign Minister Kraft last evening, the Secretary said that he had had a long and serious conversation with Selwyn Lloyd throughout most of the evening. He said that it was in the presence of Ministers Kraft and Lange and, he believed, the Permanent Norwegian Delegate to the UN. Most of the others present, who were largely Scandinavian representatives, were in a position to listen to the conversation at one time or another. The Secretary said his conversation with Lloyd was in the best of humor but was deeply serious and that Lloyd told him at the conclusion of the evening that he was deeply impressed by what the Secretary had said.
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The Secretary said that he was not certain what Lloyd's objective was and that the latter must be clear regarding what he was trying to do.
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Sometimes Lloyd spoke in terms of obtaining an armistice as the primary objective; sometimes he spoke of getting the Asians on our side in terms of world public opinion regardless of whether or not this obtained an armistice. The fundamental problem was who was deceiving whom. Was it Menon who was deceiving Lloyd or Lloyd who was deceiving Menon. Menon's desire was to obtain an armistice by having us desert our principles. An armistice in such circumstances would be easy to accomplish. This had been no secret at Panmujom over the past many months. A recognition of the calamity that could come out of all this maneuvering was essential. Menon by himself was not dangerous but Menon with Lloyd was dangerous. The Secretary was not certain that Lloyd knew what he was trying to do. If it was to obtain an armistice by changing or abandoning our principles, this was a dangerous and bitter thing. If he was attempting to deceive Menon and thus obtain additional support for our resolution, he was actually, through such an operation, placing in jeopardy our whole fundamental position (i.e., the alliance of the 21 countries sponsoring our resolution) and subjecting it to possible disintegration.
The Secretary said he felt certain the Scandinavians were not in Lloyd's camp. They were interested in whether
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Lloyd could seduce Menon into joining in lining up with the West, but they were clear on the fundamental issues.
The Secretary emphasized that what Lloyd was doing was resulting in the disintegration of a fairly well established grouping and that to gain 10 votes he would lose 30. The Secretary said it was fair to say that Lloyd's attitude and that of the Secretary had been set forth by two US Generals in the American Civil War--General Forest said, "If you can't lick him, join him", and General Grant had stated "We will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."
The Secretary said that in order to end the interminable discussion, he wanted to talk with Lloyd regarding fundamental point of view, not the minutia of various drafts. He said Lloyd was very concerned regarding the terrible war in Korea. The Secretary said he was as anxious to end the war as was Lloyd but that it was necessary to understand the fundamental nature of our position. It seemed to the Secretary that this was the acid test of whether American interest in collective security could survive and best our traditional heritage of isolation. America had now tried collective security and we must not desert it. This aspect had to be considered carefully. This had a profound importance
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for Europe. We were concerned regarding their attitude in this current test. When our direct and immediate interest was not involved, we have abandoned our principle and we really have no partnership. If the desire is to enlarge the support of the resolution at the cost of our principles, this is a hopeless and useless operation. Menon was being kept alive by Lloyd and Pearson with their brains and skill. He could not carry on as he was alone.
The result of the discussion which went on for about three hours was to shock Lloyd deeply in terms of his understanding and concept of morality.
The Secretary said that he had used as an illustration of the development of American principles.