MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
December 31, 1952
SUBJECT: Various French Questions
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy Mr. Riddleberger, GER Mr. McBride, WE
COPIES TO: S/S (2) American Embassy, Paris U American Embassy, London G American Embassy, Saigon EUR HICOG, Bonn WE RA FE PSA GER GPA GEA
1. Saar Problem
Ambassador Bonnet opened the conversation saying he had come to pay a farewell courtesy call since he was leaving for Paris tomorrow and would be away for several weeks. He then left with me a copy of Foreign Minister Schuman's most recent letter to Chancellor Adenauer on the Saar problem. He said that he thought this was a very good letter and indicated the Foreign Minister's desire to reopen negotiations on this subject. He said the letter brought out the strong support of the French for the principle of the Europeanization of the Saar and also the political agreements which already existed, as well as the difficulties in the economic field. The letter also indicated that it would be desirable to reopen negotiations and to have experts present at these talks. Mr. Riddleberger indicated that the present appeared to be a very good time to undertake renewed negotiations, particularly on the economic problem, because economic conditions at the present time in the Saar were very good. Ambassador Bonnet said he agreed with this conclusion and noted that Hoffman had received good results in the elections despite very active German propaganda. Mr. Riddleberger stated that the results of these elections had somewhat strengthened the French position. He therefore felt strongly that too much time should not be lost in renewing negotiations and
- 2 - was definitely of the opinion that the present was a particularly good time to renew the Saar talks. He added that the Saar had made a very good recovery in coal production. He noted that some French concessions would be required in fields other than in coal mining to which Ambassador Bonnet replied that some concessions had already been made recently by the French Government.
2. French Government Crisis
Passing to a discussion of the present French governmental crisis, Ambassador Bonnet said that he personally had not been very much surprised by the failure of M. Bidault to form a government because of the unpopularity of the MRP just now, particularly with the Independents, for having caused the fall of Pinay. He added that it was also his opinion that President Auriol had always felt that Rene Mayer was the person most likely to succeed in forming a cabinet and that the President had therefore turned to Mayer now, after various other possibilities had been successively eliminated. He stressed that he thought Mayer would be an excellent choice because of his profound knowledge of the French financial problem and also because of his strong belief in European union and in the EDC. He said that in any event the Prime Minister would probably be a Radical or an Independent, but that he personally hoped it would be Mayer.
3. Far Eastern Problems
The Ambassador next discussed in general terms the French financial problem and especially the effects of the Indochina war thereon. He said that there was at the present time a lack of incentive to invest in France and that only the knowledge that the franc was stable would cause people to invest more freely. He said that he hoped the European Defense Community would eventually be ratified and would succeed in equalizing the burdens of the various European nations.
The Ambassador next turned to a discussion of the Indochina problem. In response to my question he said that he felt reasonably sure that M. Letourneau, Minister of Overseas Territories, would retain his position, but he noted there were few candidates for this job anyway. I informed the Ambassador that I had had a discussion with M. Letourneau in Paris and had promised to send a group of experts to consult with him at any time after Christmas. I said that I had stressed that I wanted these people to meet with him wherever he might be, since I did not believe that otherwise their mission would be fruitful. The Ambassador said it was his understanding that Letourneau would return to Saigon shortly and that accordingly our group of experts should proceed there. I repeated that I was only waiting word from M. Letourneau in order to send these people out, and I suggested it might be well to do this
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now. The Ambassador explained there had been some slight delay because of the cabinet crisis but that he would discuss this with Letourneau in Paris and send us word himself immediately.
The Ambassador inquired whether instructions had been sent out to Admiral Radford regarding the establishment of the consultative group to discuss military problems in Southeast Asia. I replied that instructions on this general problem had been sent to Admiral Radford before my last trip to Paris but that it was my understanding it was not planned to have the Admiral himself necessarily attend the meetings, but that it had been proposed to have his deputy represent him. I assured the Ambassador we would look into the present status of this matter on an urgent basis. I added that the matter had been settled in principle and that it was merely a question of personalities now. It was our understanding that the French would like to have the first discussions in Saigon.
4. Industrial Controls in Germany
Ambassador Bonnet next brought up the problem of the expiration of the industrial controls agreement in Germany. I informed him that I had talked with the President on this matter, and that our proposal which was submitted to Paris last week had only been agreed upon after considerable discussion. The President noted that the original agreement had been drawn up in 1949, that it was clearly intended to expire now, and that its continuation seemed useless. Nevertheless he agreed to the formula which was proposed to London and Paris last week. The French counter-proposal had also been communicated to the President, and he had said that we could not agree thereto. The President insisted that the principle of unanimous approval before rejecting any applications was essential, and that the idea of a two-thirds majority was unacceptable to us. Therefore, I was under instructions to inform the Ambassador that we could not agree to the French counter-proposals but must insist on the language in our own proposal. I added that the maintenance of these controls no longer appeared to be dictated by security reasons, and that accordingly we would not take any other position. The Ambassador indicated that this was what he expected, and that he would so inform his Government although he understood we had already sent a telegram to Paris in this sense.
5. General NATO Problems
Before leaving the Ambassador discussed the general problems of NATO and asked for my impressions of the last meeting in Paris. I said that I had been considerably encouraged by this meeting, and also by several long talks that I had had, particularly with M. Pleven and M. Monnet. I noted
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particularly that the Schuman Plan High Authority under Monnet's direction was planning really important steps during the next few months, such as the beginning of the common market of the six Schuman Plan countries on February 1 and the introduction of the 1 percent tax proposal. I said that I had told Mr. Monnet that these seemed to be extremely substantial steps towards the European idea, but that unfortunately no publicity whatever had been given thereto. I told Ambassador Bonnet that I had stressed this point with Monnet, and that we hoped real information would be given to the public on these measures. The Ambassador said he recognized the need for publicizing the activities of the High Authority, and that he would discuss this question in Paris and try to bring back material with which a campaign might be undertaken in this country.
In closing, in response to the Ambassador's question as to what matters I thought he might usefully discuss in Paris, I indicated I still believed that European unity was the vital question which must be stressed, because if we don't succeed in that, we shall have nothing.
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