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Robert B. Landry Oral History Interview, March 1-2, 1983

Oral History Interview with
Robert B. Landry

U.S. Army officer, 1932-63; Air Aide to President Truman, 1948-53.

Scottsdale, Arizona
March 1-2, 1983
by Hugh A. Ahmann, United States Air Force Oral History Program

See also: Robert B. Landry Oral History, by James R. Fuchs of the Harry S. Truman Library.

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Table of Contents]


Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted by The United States Air Force Oral History Program . The reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened February 1990
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Table of Contents]



Oral History Interview with
Robert B. Landry

Scottsdale, Arizona
March 1-2, 1983
by Hugh A. Ahmann, United States Air Force Oral History Program


[iii]

FOREWORD

One of the oldest and oft-used sources for reconstructing the past is the personal recollections of the individuals who were involved. While of great value, memoirs and oral interviews are primary source documents rather than finished history. The following pages are the personal remembrances of the interviewee and not the official opinion of the United States Air Force Historical Program or of the Department of the Air Force. The Air Force has not verified the statements contained herein and does not assume any responsibility for their accuracy.

These pages are a transcript of an oral interview recorded on magnetic tape. Editorial notes and additions made by United States Air Force historians have been enclosed in brackets. When feasible, first names, ranks, or titles have been provided. Only minor changes for the sake of clarity were made before the transcript was returned to the interviewee for final editing and approval. Readers must therefore remember that this is a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written, word.

[v]

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Maj. Gen Robert B. Landry, have on (date) 1-2 March, 1983, participated in an oral magnetic taped interview with Hugh N. Ahmann, USAF Historical Research Center, covering my best recollections of events and experiences which may be of historical significance to the United States Air Force.

I understand that the tape(s) and the transcribed manuscript resulting there from will be accessioned into the United States Air Force Historical Research Center to be used as the security classification permits. It is further understood and agreed that any copy or copies of this oral history interview given to me by the United States Air Force and in my possession or that of my executors, administrators, heirs, and assigns, may be used in any manner and for any purpose by me or them, subject to security classification restrictions.

Subject to the license to use reserved above, I do hereby voluntarily give, transfer, convey, and assign all right, title, and interest in the memoirs and remembrances contained in the aforementioned magnetic tapes and manuscript to the Office of Air Force History, acting on behalf of the United States of America, to have and to hold the same forever, hereby relinquishing for myself, my executors, administrators, heirs, and assigns all ownership, right, title, and interest therein to the donee expressly on the condition of strict observance of the following restrictions:

DONOR: Robert B. Landry, Maj. General, USAF (Retired)

DATED: Feb 3, 1990
Accepted on behalf of the Office of Air Force History by: Elliott V. Converse, III, Col. USAF

DATED: Feb 13, 1990

[vii]

BIOGRAPHY

OF

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT B. LANDRY

Major General Robert B. Landry was born on 1 December 1909 in New Orleans, Louisiana. He attended Tulane University for a year and then entered the U.S. Military Academy from which he was graduated in June 1932, and appointed a second lieutenant of Infantry. After serving at infantry installations in the United States for 2 years, he began flying training and in March 1935, was graduated with the rating of pilot and transferred to the Air Corps.

General Landry's first Air Corps assignment was as flying instructor at Kelly Field, Texas, followed by a 2 year tour of duty in the Panama Canal Zone. He then became a squadron Commander of the 493d Bomb Group; and Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the Air Staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.

General Landry, in January 1946, was appointed a member of the Joint Operations Review Board of the Army Navy Staff College. The following July he entered the National War College, from which he was graduated in July 1947. A month later he was named executive to the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. In February 1948, General Landry was appointed Air Aide to President Truman.

He was designated deputy commander of the Second Air Force at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, in January 1953. On 7 February 1955, he became Commander of the Fourth Air Force, Continental Air Command, Hamilton AFB, California. In July 1957, he transferred as Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. In June 1960 he was assigned to McClellan AFB, California. He retired in June 1962.

[ix]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PEARL HARBOR
AIR FORCE TOOK OVER THE AC&W CONTROL CENTER
ARMY WAS JEALOUS OF THEIR AUTHORITY
STUDY OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE HAWAIIAN AF TO FIGHT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF HAWAII
NO WAR PLAN FOR HAWAII
ROOSEVELT DID NOT KNOW THE JAPS WERE GOING TO ATTACK PEARL HARBOR
BATTLE OF MIDWAY
FAMILY HISTORY
WEST POINT
FIRST ASSIGNMENT WAS AT CAMP STEPHEN D. LITTLE
INTEREST IN FLYING
APPLIED FOR PILOT TRAINING AT RANDOLPH AFB
ARMY PREJUDICE AGAINST THE AF
LIFE IN THE ARMY AT FORT HUACHUCA
BEGAN FLYING TRAINING IN 1935
FLYING INSTRUCTION AT RANDOLPH AFB
WASHOUT RATE
WENT INTO PURSUIT FLYING
TRANSFERRED TO PANAMA CANAL ZONE
DEFENSE PLANS OF PANAMA CANAL ZONE
NAVY EXERCISE IN PANAMA CANAL ZONE
HE WENT FROM POLLIWOG TO SHELLBACK
ASSIGNED TO BARKSDALE AFB, 20TH PURSUIT GROUP
DEPRESSION YEARS IN THE MILITARY
BALLOONISTS WENT TO HEAVIER THAN AIR
 
[x]
 
WAS AIDE TO GEN FRED MARTIN
GHQ HEADQUARTERS AND OFFICE OF AIR CORPS CONFLICT
ARMY EXERCISES AT FORT POLK, LA
SET UP AN EXERCISE FOR RESERVISTS
INACTIVE RESERVISTS FLEW OUT OF BARKSDALE AFB
GEN FRED MARTIN
AEROBATIC SHOW AT MARCH AFB
OBTAINED A B-18 FOR THE COMMAND AIRPLANE
COL HARRY OCKER DEVELOPED INSTRUMENT FLYING
IFR
LINK TRAINER
OLDTIMERS IN THE AIR CORPS
AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL
BETTER PART OF AIR CORPS BUDGET WENT TO THE B-17
GEN HOWARD DAVIDSON BROUGHT THE B-15 TO BARKSDALE AFB
WENT TO HAWAII AS GENERAL MARTIN'S AIDE AND OPERATIONS
HE HAD NO THOUGHTS OF WAR IN 1939
GEN H. H. ARNOLD
MURRAY GREEN ASSISTED HIM ON THE STUDY OF THE SALEM WITCH HUNTS
HAWAIIAN AF INVENTORY WHEN JAPS ATTACKED
RELATIONS WITH THE ARMY AND NAVY
PERSONNEL STATIONED IN HAWAII
BALLINGER REPORT
AIR CORPS HAD IDENTIFIED ITS MISSION IN HAWAII
FIRST RADAR IN HAWAII
ARMY REFUSED TO DISPERSE THE AIRCRAFT
INDICATIONS OF TROUBLE IN LATE 1940
B-I7 VERSUS B-24
ESTABLISHMENT OF HAWAIIAN AF
HE KNEW THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN THE PACIFIC
JAPANESE AIRCRAFT AND CARRIERS
 
[xi]
 
DUTIES AS GENERAL MARTIN'S AIDE
B-17S LOST AT CLARK FIELD
EVENTS OF 7 DECEMBER 1941
ARMY COULD NOT BELIEVE IN AIRPOWER
THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
TREATMENT OF JAPANESE POPULATION AFTER THE ATTACK
THE DEPENDENTS WERE SENT BACK TO THE STATES
EFFECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL MARTIN RELEASED HIM TO JOIN THE VIII FIGHTER COMMAND
TRANSFERRED TO EIGHTH AIR FORCE
HE SET UP THE EARLY WARNING PLOTTING OUTFIT IN HAWAII
REPORTED TO GENERAL SPAATZ IN WASHINGTON
PREPARATION FOR OVERWATER FLIGHT OF B-17s AND P-38s
FLIGHT TO ENGLAND
P-38s ARE STILL FROZEN IN ICECAP
COL BERNT BALCHEN
VIII FIGHTER COMMAND ORGANIZATION
WENT TO NORTH AFRICA ON TDY
USE OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES
GETTING INFORMATION GAINED BACK TO THE STATES
EVALUATION OF PREPAREDNESS OF AAC FOR WWII
HE DID A STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE IN NORTH AFRICA
GEN GEORGE PATTON
OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR VIII FIGHTER COMMAND
COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH
SPITFIRES VERSUS P-47s
UTILIZATION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
P-51 HAD BUILT IN TANKS
AF PROTECTED GROUND TROOPS
ESCORT AIRCRAFT FLEW AT 15,000 FEET
EVALUATION OF GERMAN STRATEGY
OXYGEN MASK DEFECTS
 
[xii]
 
P-47
COL HUB ZEMKE COMMANDED THE 56TH FIGHTER GROUP
QUALITY OF PILOTS
OLDTIMERS IN EUROPE
WORKED FOR GENERAL DOOLITTLE
LACK OF MORAL FIBER COMMITTEE
APPRECIATION OF GERMAN AIRCRAFT
FIRST GERMAN JET
GEN JOHANNES STEINHOFF
ASSIGNED TO AIR STAFF AT SHAEF
DEPUTY COMMANDER, 93D COMBAT BOMB WING
HIS APPRECIATION OF AF LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE DURING WWII
GENERALS SPAATZ AND DOOLITTLE
SHUTTLE BOMBING
BOMBING WITH RADAR
BOMBING OF DRESDEN IN APRIL 1945
GEN IRA EAKER'S ASSIGNMENT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN
METHOD OF REPORTING KILLS
SERVICE AWARDS DURING WORLD WAR II
TACTICS AND METHODS OF FLYING
100TH BOMB GROUP
END OF WAR IN EUROPE
ORDERED TO AIR STAFF SHAEF
DUTIES AT SHAEF
US STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
CONDITIONS IN GERMANY
RETURNED TO THE STATES
ASSIGNED TO THE STAFF AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
ASSIGNED TO GENERAL SPAATZ' OFFICE, HQ AAF
GENERAL KEPNER REPLACED GENERAL HUNTER IN EUROPE, WWII
ALLIES HAD TOTAL AIR SUPERIORITY OVER FRANCE
OBTAINED THE AERIAL CAMERA BEFORE THE NORMANDY INVASION
 
[xiii]
 
DUTIES AS AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY AIR FORCE
AF BECAME A SEPARATE SERVICE
CHAIN OF COMMAND
ORGANIZATION OF HQ USAF
DUPLICATION OF SERVICES
GEN BENNETT MEYERS
UNIFICATION OF SERVICES IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DOD
70 GROUP PROGRAM
DOD ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT
OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY A COMBINED AIR OFFENSIVE
GENERAL SPAATZ
HIS DEFINITION OF LEADERSHIP
GEN IRA EAKER
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
SPAATZ INFLUENCED CHOICE OF HIS SUCCESSOR
ASSIGNED AS AF AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT
GEN "ROSIE" O' DONNELL
GEN HARRY VAUGHN
AF WAS IN FLUX IN LATE 1940s
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN WWII
COMMUNICATIONS DURING WWII
BATTLE OF THE BULGE
NO DOUBTS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF WWII
SECRETARY FORRESTAL
ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON TRIPS
ARRANGED PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MEETING ON WAKE ISLAND WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR
ASPHALT VERSUS CEMENT RUNWAY CONTROVERSY
AIR FORCE ONE COMMANDER
KEPT THE PRESIDENT CURRENT ABOUT PROBLEMS WITH AIRCRAFT
 
[xiv]
 
THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR
MACARTHUR WAS RELIEVED OF HIS COMMAND
KOREAN CONFLICT
THE PRESIDENT'S REASON FOR MEETING WITH MACARTHUR
BERLIN BLOCKADE
RELUCTANCE OF AF TO REASSIGN HIM
ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON TRUMAN'S LIFE
DESEGREGATION OF ARMED FORCES
TRUMAN DECIDED NOT TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT AGAIN
PRESIDENTS TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER
SECRETARY LOUIS JOHNSON
OTHER MATTERS WHICH CONCERNED THE PRESIDENT
ROLES AND MISSIONS
ACTIVITIES HE WAS INVOLVED IN AS AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT
REORGANIZATION OF DOD
TRUMAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
NO INFIGHTING AMONG PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S STAFF
COORDINATION BETWEEN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND DOD
RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESS
EARLY DAYS OF SAC
ESTABLISHMENT OF AFA
SECRETARY SYMINGTON
TRUMAN WAS AWARE OF WAR PLANS
HOOVER COMMISSION
TRUMAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS STAFF
TRUMAN LIVED IN THE BLAIR HOUSE FOR 3 YEARS
ASSIGNED AS DEPUTY COMMANDER, SECOND AF
DUTIES AS DEPUTY COMMANDER, SECOND AF
GENERAL POWER CALLED THE DEPUTY COMMANDERS TO SAC HQ
GENERAL LEMAY
SPOT PROMOTIONS IN SAC
ENLISTMENT RATE IN SAC
 
[xv]
 
GENERAL POWER
TRANSFERRED TO FOURTH AF
STATUS OF AF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD IN FOURTH AF
FOURTH AF COMMANDER WAS A PR JOB
PROBLEMS WITH RESERVE ASSIGNMENTS
TRANSFERRED TO DCS/PERSONNEL, HQ USAF
GENERAL PROMOTION BOARDS
INFLATION OF OERS
WHITE CHARGER PROGRAM
CADET PROGRAM
SAC PERSONNEL WENT TO CHIEF OF STAFF LEMAY
DID NOT USE CONSULTING FIRMS IN PERSONNEL
LEMAY MOVED PERSONNEL TO RANDOLPH AFB
LEADERSHIP
MILITARY PAY
PROFICIENCY PAY
AF WAS "SACOMCIZED"
PUBLIC LAW 616
ASSIGNED TO MCCLELLAN AFB
COMLOGNET
RETIREES WORKING FOR AF CONTRACTORS
DID NOT UTILIZE COMMAND HISTORIES
WORST ASSIGNMENT IN HIS AF CAREER

[1]

Oral History Interview #K239.0512-1372
1-2 March 1983
Taped Interview with Maj Gen Robert B. Landry
Conducted by Mr. Hugh A. Ahmann
Transcribed and Edited by Mary E. Monday

(Interview begins with Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941)

AHMANN: Have you read this recent book, At Dawn We Slept, by Prange

LANDRY: Yes. I have it up in the library here.

AHMANN: That is a massive account.

LANDRY: That was done by a lieutenant commander in the Navy who continued in the Navy and had very good assignments. Afterwards I think he retired from the State Department or someplace. He continued to pursue this. I'm still reading the bibliography. (laughter) And I was there.

AHMANN: Has anybody ever come to talk to you about Pearl Harbor at all?

LANDRY: No. Just some friends of mine who were over there.

AHMANN: Did you know Kermit Tyler [Lt. Col. Kermit A.] over there when you were there? He was that man who was at the plotting board on 7 December, that morning. He was at the control center, the AC&W [air control and warning) control center.

[2]

LANDRY: I probably have met him because Fort Shafter had the responsibility of setting up that plotting board. The Army was so goddamn jealous of the Air Force all the time that, Christ, they wanted to do everything. They set the goddamn various degrees of alertness. We fought them on that and lost, and we lost the whole goddamn air force out there because we lined them up wingtip to wingtip. They wanted to run the plotting board and was slow in getting it started. Of course we were not getting the equipment anyway. But we had nothing to do with it except as they might ask somebody something when they wanted to.

I'll guarantee you, after the attack came, we took it over right away, and the Hawaiian Fighter Command was set up. As a matter of fact, I became the executive officer, first to "Monk" Hunter [Maj Gen Frank O'D.] who was flown over and then replaced by Howard Davidson [Maj Gen Howard C.], who knew nothing about fighters. It was my responsibility to get that plotting center going. We got it going, and of course, we got materiel from the States. We got all the volunteer ladies there whose husbands were out fighting the war and people living there. We had a hell of a good plotting center eventually.

AHMANN: Where did the idea germinate for that plotting center? When did that originally get set up? Do you remember that? Or was that going when you got there?

LANDRY: Like I say--oh, no, it was not going when we got there. They had nothing like that. As a matter of fact, I got there in November 1940. There wasn't anything like it; there wasn't any feeling of a great threat although the Japanese were acting kind of funny even in those days, but no threat

[3]

of immediate attack. I would say that probably the priority for the equipment available, considering expenses, costs, and budgets, I guess Hawaii was pretty low on the totem pole. But eventually, I think as the situation began to deteriorate, the Japanese Fleet was sailing all around the Pacific; the possibility of an attack was always there, but it seemed so far away that a lot of people thought it would be other places first.

AHMANN: It was that remote.

LANDRY: It was that remote. So we did get the station up there on the northwest point of the Island of Oahu that detected the airplanes coming in, picked up the B-17s that were coming in and the others. They thought they were all the same thing. That was going, and the information was not even--well, it was probably telephoned to Shafter. Somebody took it, but they didn't know what to do with it. It was Sunday morning. There was no procedure; there was nothing written. We had not a goddamn thing to do with it. The Army was running it.

AHMANN: What was the Army, ostensibly, supposed to do with the information, alert the Air Force?

LANDRY: Eventually, I suppose they would have gotten an operational procedure going and alerted somebody. I was assistant A-3 in addition to being aide to General Martin [Maj Gen Frederick L.] and we didn't have any information about anything up there. We knew people were up there.

But it wasn't piped to the Air Force; it was piped to Fort Shafter to Mr. Short's [Maj Gen Walter C.] outfit. Those b-----ds were so jealous of their goddamn authority and

[4]

prerogatives that it was always a fight with them. As a matter of fact, General Martin ordered us to make a study--Art Meehan [Col Arthur W. ] who was the A-3, and I--of the capability of the Hawaiian Air Force to fight. We had the B-18s which had a range of action of a very small bomb load of about 225-250 miles. We had a bunch of fighters up at Wheeler (AFB HI) and that sort of thing, but we had no warning business.

The Air Force could never go direct to our own Air Force Headquarters at Langley--General Andrews [Lt Gen Frank M.] in those days. Well, in a sense you could, because our efficiency reports went through there and all that, administratively. But if you got into policy, and you got into budget; you got into equipment, and you got into control, if you got outside the Army lines, I want to tell you, you got fired or court-martialed or both.

It wasn't easy. General Martin was dealing with some of our people I suppose. I know he was. We wanted to get a study to show that the equipment we had was inadequate for the defense of the island, for the air defense, for the air support and defense. So we made this study. We worked on it for 90 days. They gave us 90 days to do it, Art Meehan and I, and I did a great portion of it. All we did was plot possible routes out from the island 225-250 miles. Well, Jesus, a carrier could stay outside of 350 and launch, and you would never know it. Then they could come in and recover, and we would just be flying around out there boring holes in the sky.

It was that straightforward. We just said it. We said, "It is absolutely impossible. We have to have the equipment out

[5]

here. The Navy is patrolling and is supposed to give us early warning with the old PBY boats." So there was no great deal of priority put on Hawaii by the bigshots in Washington. All this foolishness about messages being received and transmitted or not transmitted, it was a mess. Who is responsible? I really don't know. I don't think Mr. Roosevelt [President Franklin D.] had anything to do with trying to start the war.

AHMANN: The responsibility for the defense of Hawaii had to be with Kimmel [Adm. Husband E.] , Short, Martin, and Kimmel.

LANDRY: If you want to do it that way, but you have to remember that in those days we had a thing called unification. Even though the Air Force was not a service--it was the Army Air Force--we had the only goddamn air force that was land based anyway, except for the carriers.

We had unification, and under the unification act--I think Forrestal [James V.] was in those days--the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines were all supposed to get along. You were not supposed to use your position of superior rank and all that if you sat, say, at the council table.

Well, you know that old dog won't hunt, because you take a four-star admiral, who has the overall responsibility for the Pacific, who is sitting at the table with a three-star Army man, who has the responsibility for the land based thing, and a two-star guy, who is not responsible to Short and then to Kimmel and can't talk to his own War Department in Washington, well, you can see how silly unification was. It was just an awful phase, in my opinion, during my experience, to see some effort to get people to work together without

[6]

having the proper setup to do it, the controls, the law, the authority.

AHMANN: At the time you went to Hawaii, it was obvious that there was no plan--I mean, was it pretty vague?

LANDRY: There was a War Department plan that the Navy would offshore patrol; we would build up the bomber force with the B-18, which was all we had then. The B-17 was not really in production. There were a few coming along. And the P-40s that we had and the fighters. So you build up your local war plans based on the equipment you had. I just got a feel that Hawaii was not a very high priority target. It wasn't close enough to Japan. That's my opinion.

Sure, we had a war plan, but I think all of us felt that, Christ, what we got--nobody anticipated a surprise attack. You have to admit that the Japanese did a beautiful job, and they handled it beautifully and executed it beautifully and did a great deal of damage. I think even had we known we might have made it a lot more difficult for them, but coming in with the force they had and the equipment we had, I don't think the B-18s could have done much. They couldn't have gotten out there, for Christ's sake. I mean, they just didn't have the radius of action.

We couldn't send them out there and have them all drop in the ocean coming back. So like we had the limit of armed endurance with the fighters over in the Eighth Air Force later, which I was in, a limit of armed endurance was the radius of action. The bombers wanted to go in further and get the hell shot out of them, which they did a few times like at Schweinfurt and Regensburg, and lose 50 to 60

[7]

bombers. They didn't keep doing that. They waited for their little friends. You had better believe it.

AHMANN: The reason I asked if anybody had ever talked to you is that I have read books where this Kermit Tyler--he retired out of the Air Force as a lieutenant colonel in the 1950s or 1960s--is quoted in books, actual words he said and things he did. I went to interview him one time, and I missed him. But I talked to him on the telephone. I said, "Did Walter Lord ever talk to you?" He said, "No, nobody has ever talked to me." Here, they were putting words in his mouth and everything. So that was one reason I asked you.

LANDRY: I don't even remember seeing that name. I think I read most of the books.

AHMANN: Yes, he would be mentioned in all those books.

LANDRY: It may be in there. That, in my opinion, is the best book ever put out. I don't think it is prejudicial at all. He just calls the facts. As I say, I haven't even gotten to the book yet. I'm reading the bibliography. I have several others.

AHMANN: Another book by Toland, Infamy, I just read that recently as a matter of fact. He tries to build a case that Roosevelt knew full well that----

LANDRY: I'll tell you one thing. Anybody who takes that position is either stupid or prejudice or crazy.

AHMANN: You are totally convinced in your mind----

[8]

LANDRY: No way in the world is the President of the United States going to do anything like that. Jesus, all you have to do is read this book, and you will find out the problem the President had, A Man Called Intrepid. That is not a history, but it is 95 percent true. It wasn't written until after the information could be verified at, what is the place in Washington? 25 years.

AHMANN: The National Archives.

LANDRY: Now if you think that Mr. Roosevelt was going to accept an attack like that and be in danger of losing the whole fleet, and if you consider the battleships, anything--you know, what Mitchell (Maj Gen William) had shown them would happen to them--well, then goddamn it, they sunk the Navy, just about. Just lucky that the Saratoga and Lexington were out at sea.

AHMANN: These same people who wrote this At Dawn We Slept have now written a book that has just come out abou